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In the fall of 2008, hundreds of Native Hawaiians' and their supporters lined
the streets near the Hawai'i State Capitol wearing red T-shirts with the words
"Kii I Ka Pono" 2 printed across the front and holding signs reading, "Justice for
Hawaiians" and "Ceded Lands Are Stolen Lands."3 The demonstrators were
showing their support for a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Ronald T.Y. Moon that placed a moratorium on the sale of state "ceded"
lands-a groundbreaking decision that provides insight into the Moon Court's
view of Native Hawaiian claims to lands, resources, and sovereignty.
This article examines the decisions of the Hawai'i Supreme Court during the
seventeen-year tenure of Chief Justice Moon and the court's role as mediator
and interpreter in addressing the claims of the Native Hawaiian community. It
suggests that, to a large extent, Hawai'i's people are engaged in a reconciliation
process rooted in kanaka maoli or Native Hawaiian values-values that seek
balance, harmony, and aloha. The Moon Court has furthered these efforts in
two significant ways: by opening the courts to Native Hawaiian claims and by
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native
Hawaiian Law, William S. Richardson School of Law. I wish to express my deep gratitude to
Chief Justice William S. Richardson for his many years of guidance and support. Mahalo nui to
Nathaniel T. Noda (WSRSL '09), former Ka Huli Ao Post-JD Research & Scholarship Fellow,
and to Amanda L. Donlin (WSRSL '11) and Elena Bryant (WSRSL '11).
In this article, unless otherwise noted, "Native Hawaiian" means "any individual who is a
descendent of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in
the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii." Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th
Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to Offer an
Apology to Native Hawaiians on Behalf of the United States for the Overthrow of the Kingdom
of Hawaii, Pub. L. No. 103-150, §2, 107 Stat. 1510, 1513 (1993) [hereinafter Apology
Resolution].
2 Kit I Ka Pono means "Stand for Justice."
3 See Lisa Asato, Youth Uprising-Ceded Lands Case Spurs New Generation ofHawaiian
Leaders, KA WAI OLA, Jan. 2009, at 15, available at
http://www.oha.orgkwo/2009/01/story01.php; Groups Oppose Ceded-LandAppeal, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Nov. 24, 2008, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2008/Nov/24/br/hawaii81124053.htmiL
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understanding and recognizing the true harm-the emotional and spiritual costs
as well as the loss of land and sovereignty-to the Native Hawaiian
community.
This article surveys the Moon Court's decisions in three areas impacting
Native Hawaiian rights. Necessarily, this can only be a brief summary of the
most important cases because the Moon Court decided numerous cases dealing
with Native Hawaiian issues.4 First, the Moon Court built upon and expanded
earlier decisions relating to Hawaiian traditional and customary rights. Second,
the court proved largely sympathetic to Hawaiian Home Lands beneficiary
claims relating to breaches of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act. Finally,
the court fully acknowledged the historical basis for Native Hawaiian claims
when deciding controversial issues surrounding the public land trust or "ceded"
lands. Jurisdictional and procedural obstacles have often threatened to sound
the death knell for otherwise meritorious claims in all of these areas. Based on
the significant public interest in addressing Native Hawaiian claims, the
constitutional recognition of Native Hawaiian rights, and the court's own
commitment to fairness, the Moon Court allowed Native Hawaiians to pursue
their claims through the courts.
It would be a mistake to conclude that the Moon Court always ruled in favor
of Native Hawaiian interests. Indeed, the court has rebuffed attempts to clarify
the public land trust revenues due to the Native Hawaiian community. In a
criminal law context, the court also limited Native Hawaiian traditional and
customary rights.6 Nevertheless, it is a fair assessment to say that for the last
seventeen years, under the leadership of Chief Justice Moon, the Hawai'i
Supreme Court has chosen the path of justice, Ke Ala Pono.
4 In addition to the thirteen cases discussed in this article, the Moon Court also decided
important water rights and environmental cases that significantly impact the Native Hawaiian
community. This is in sharp contrast to the court under Chief Justice Herman T. F. Lum, which
issued relatively few opinions on Native Hawaiian issues and has been criticized for the
widespread use of non-precedential memorandum opinions. See Melody Kapilialoha
MacKenzie, The Lum Court and Native Hawaiian Rights, 14 U. HAw. L. REv. 377 (1992)
[hereinafter MacKenzie, The Lum Court]. As discussed infra Part 1II, the Lum Court did decide
a leading case, Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992), in which
Associate Justice Robert G. Klein, writing for a unanimous court, established important
principles on standing and sovereign immunity as well as substantive law on Native Hawaiian
traditional and customary rights and the State's trust duties relative to the public land trust.
5 See infra Part V for a discussion of Office ofHawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 1), 96 Haw.
388,31 P.3d 901 (2001), Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 11), 110 Haw. 338,133 P.3d
767 (2006), and Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hawaii State Legislature, No. 30535,2010 Haw.
LEXIS 184 (Aug. 18, 2010).
6 See infra Part III for a discussion of State v. Hanapi, 89 Haw. 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1998).
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT7
Hdnau ka 'dina, hdnau ke ali'i, hdnau ke kanaka.
Born was the land, born were the chiefs, born were the common people.
So begins an ancient Hawaiian proverb that describes the inseparable
spiritual and genealogical connection between Native Hawaiians and the land
and environment. For Native Hawaiians, the land, or 'dina, is not a mere
physical reality. Instead, it is an integral component of social, cultural, and
spiritual life.9 Like many indigenous peoples, Native Hawaiians see an
interdependent, reciprocal relationship between the gods, the land, and the
people.
In stark contrast to the Western notion of privately held property, Hawaiians
did not conceive of land as exclusive and alienable, but as communal and
shared.' 0 The land, like a cherished relative, cared for the Native Hawaiian
people, and in return, the people cared for the land." The principle of malama
'dina (care of the land) is therefore directly linked to conserving and protecting
not only the land and its resources, but humankind and the spiritual world as
well. 12
Western colonialism throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
dramatically altered this relationship to the land. Hawaiian lands were divided,
confiscated, and sold away.' 3 Native Hawaiian cultural practices were barred
and ways of life denigrated.14 Large sugar plantations diverted water from
Text in this section has appeared in other publications, including Melody Kapilialoha
MacKenzie, Law and the Courts, in THE VALUE OF HAWAI'I: KNOWING THE PAST, SHAPING THE
FUTURE 85 (Craig Howes & Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio eds., 2010); Melody
Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Susan K. Serrano & Koa Laura Kaulukukui, A New Kind of
Environmental Justice: Indigenous Hawaiians Reclaiming Land and Resources, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 37, 37 (2007); and NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW (Melody Kapilialoha
MacKenzie, Susan K. Serrano & D. Kapua'ala Sproat eds., Native Hawaiian Rights Handbook
2d ed., forthcoming 2013).
8 MARY KAWENA PUKUI, 'OLELO NO'EAu: HAWAIIAN PROVERBS & POETICAL SAYINGS 56
(1983).
SDAVIANNA POMAIKA'I MCGREGOR, NA KUA'AINA: LIVING HAWAIIAN CULTURE 23-26
(2007).
'0 LILIKALA KAME' ELEIIlWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PoNo AI? 24
(1992); E.S. CRAIGHILL HANDY & ELIZABETH GREEN HANDY, NATIVE PLANTERS IN OLD HAWAII:
THEIR LIFE, LORE, AND ENVIRONMENT 41 (1972).1 KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 10, at 24.
12 id.
1 NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 6-10 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 1991)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]; COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 366-68 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005).
14 See, e.g., I NATIVE HAWAIIANS STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CULTURE, NEEDS AND
CONCERNS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS 191-98 (1983) (Hawaiian language); Noenoe K. Silva, He
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Hawaiian communities.15 Hawaiians were separated from the land, thereby
severing cultural and spiritual connections.
In the Mihele, the Hawaiian Kingdom's mid-nineteenth century conversion
to private property, King Kamehameha III set aside more than 1.5 million acres
as Government Lands for the benefit of the chiefs and people.16 The Crown
Lands, which had originally been reserved as the King's private lands and
made inalienable in 1865, comprised almost a million acres and provided a
source of income and support for the Crown.17 Following the illegal overthrow
of the Hawaiian government in 1893 by U.S. military-backed American
businessmen 8 and the 1894 establishment of the Republic of Hawai'i, the
Government and Crown Lands were merged.'9 In 1898, the Republic "ceded"
approximately 1.8 million acres of these lands to the United States through a
Joint Resolution of Annexation.2 0
In 1921, the U.S. Congress passed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act
(HHCA) 21 to address the deteriorating social and economic conditions of the
Hawaiian people.22 Congress set aside approximately 203,000 acres of the
Government and Crown Lands, designated as Hawaiian Home Lands, for a
homesteading program benefitting those of not less than fifty percent Hawaiian
ancestry. 23
Kandwai E Ho'opau INa Hula Kuolu Rawai'i: The Political Economy ofBanning the Hula,
34 HAWAIIAN J. HIST. 29 (2000) (hula). See also Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 295 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1150 (D. Haw. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (describing effect of Western influences
on Native Hawaiians).
15 HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 153; D. Kapua'ala Sproat, Water, in THE VALUE OF
HAWAI'I: KNOWING THE PAST, SHAPING THE FUTURE, supra note 7, at 187, 188-90.
16 See generally KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 10, for a detailed explanation of the Mahele.
The Mihele process "transformed the traditional Land tenure system from one of communal
tenure to private ownership on the capitalist model." Id. at 8. See also MCGREGOR, supra note
9, at 35-40.
17 JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAwAI'I? 40-42, 89-92, 111-17
(2008).
18 Apology Resolution, supra note 1, "whereas" cls. 5-10, § 1(1), (3), 107 Stat. at 1510-11,
1513.
19 A provision of the Land Act of 1895 (codified at LAWS OF HAWAII 1895, § 445) defined
public lands to include Government and Crown lands. Land Act of 1895, 1895 Haw. Sess.
Laws 49-83.
20 Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, 30
Stat. 750 (1898).
21 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921)
(formerly codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 691-718 (1958)) (omitted from codification in
1959) (set out in full as amended at I HAW. REv. STAT. 261).
22 See infra Part IV.
23 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, § 208. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note
13, at ch. 3 for a discussion of the history and implementation of the HHCA. See infra Part IV.
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The 1959 Hawai'i Admission Act transferred approximately 1.4 million
acres of the Government and Crown Lands, including the HHCA lands, to the
State.24 As a condition of statehood and as a trust responsibility, Hawai'i
agreed to incorporate the HHCA into the state constitution and administer the
Hawaiian Home Lands.25 The State was to hold all of the transferred lands,
along with their income and proceeds, for one or more of five trust purposes,
including benefitting Native Hawaiians, as defined in the HHCA.
In 1978, after more than a decade of activism focused on struggles over land,
efforts to halt the U.S. Navy's bombing of the island of Kaho'olawe, and
cultural revitalization,27 the people of Hawai'i amended their constitution to
"prescribe[] an idealized, self-sufficient, and environmentally sensitive
approach to government." 28 Among the amendments were provisions
recognizing the right to a clean and healthful environment29 and declaring
Hawai'i's natural resources to be held in trust by the State for the benefit ofthe
people. 3 0 Probably the most far-reaching amendments, however, addressed
long-standing claims of the Hawaiian community. These amendments were
24 Admission Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5, 73 Stat. 4, 5-6.
25 Section 4 of the Admission Act provides, in part: "As a compact with the United States
relating to the management and disposition of the Hawaiian home lands, the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, 1920, as amended, shall be adopted as a provision of the Constitution of said
State[.]" Id. § 4; see also Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 336-38, 640
P.2d 1161, 1167-68 (1982). The Ahuna court described the genesis of the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act and concluded that the federal government undertook "a trust obligation
benefiting the aboriginal people," and that "the State of Hawaii assumed this fiduciary
obligation upon being admitted into the Union as a state." Id. at 338, 640 P.2d at 1168.
26 Section 5(f) of the Admission Act provides:
The lands granted to the State of Hawaii ... together with the proceeds from the sale or
other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State
as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational
institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and
home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible[,] for the making of public
improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and
income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in
such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any
other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United
States.
Admission Act, § 5(f) (emphasis added).
27 See Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, Hawaiian Issues, in THE VALUE OF HAWAI'I:
KNOWING THE PAST, SHAPING THE FUTURE, supra note 7, at 15, 15-21 (discussing the Hawaiian
movement and its evolution).
28 Tom Coffman, Reinventing Hawai'i, in THE VALUE OF HAWAI'I: KNOWING THE PAST,
SHAPING THE FUTURE, supra note 7, at 9, 12.
29 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
30 Id. art. XI, § 1.
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reparatory-they sought to redress historical claims and to provide resources
and a measure of self-determination to Native Hawaiians. They recognized the
loss of sovereignty and land resulting from the 1893 illegal overthrow of the
Hawaiian Kingdom, and they specifically dealt with three of the areas of law in
which the Moon Court has made its most groundbreaking decisions-the
traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiians, the Hawaiian Home
Lands trust, and the "ceded" or public land trust.
The 1978 constitutional amendments recognized and protected the traditional
and customary practices of ahupua'a tenants.' Other amendments sought to
strengthen the Hawaiian Home Lands program by ensuring sufficient funding
and reaffirming the State's commitment to faithfully carry out the terms of the
HHCA.32 The amendments established an Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA),
with a board of trustees elected by the Hawaiian people to manage resources
and funds, including revenue from the public land trust.33 Another amendment
clarified that the lands designated as part of the public land trust, about 1.2
million acres after separating out the HHCA lands, were held in trust for Native
Hawaiians and the general public.34
Other amendments mandated that the State promote the study of Hawaiian
culture, history, and language and provide for a Hawaiian education program in
the public schools. The Hawaiian language was designated as one of two
official languages of Hawai' i,36 and limitations were placed on the doctrine of
adverse possession, which played a significant role in the dispossession of
Hawaiians from their lands.37
In the decades since the enactment of these provisions, Hawai'i courts have
been called upon to interpret these amendments, to explicate the terms of the
Hawaiian Home Lands and public land trusts, and to give both the trusts and
amendments concrete meaning. The Moon Court has not backed away from
that responsibility. It has sought reconciliation and healing and, most
31 Id. art. XII, § 7. An ahupua'a is an economically self-sufficient, pie-shaped unit that runs
from the mountaintops down ridges spreading out at the base along the shore. In re Boundaries
of Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 239, 241-42 (1879). See also infra Part III.
32 HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-3. See Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 127 Haw. 185,
277 P.3d 279 (2012) (what constitutes "sufficient sums" for Department of Hawaiian Home
Lands' administrative and operating expenses is not a political question, but what constitutes
"sufficient sums" in relation to development of homestead lots, loans, and rehabilitation projects
present nonjusticiable political questions).
33 Id. art. XII, §§ 5-6.
34 Id. art. XII, § 4.
" Id. art. X, § 4.
36 Id. art. XV, § 4.
" Id. art. XVI, § 12. See LINDA S. PARKER, NATIVE AMERICAN ESTATE: THE STRUGGLE
OVER INDIAN AND HAWAIIAN LANDs 115-19 (1989) and HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 119-22,
for discussion of adverse possession in Hawai'i.
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importantly, allowed the claims of the Hawaiian people to be fully expressed
and heard. In almost all cases, the Moon Court has consciously chosen Ke Ala
Pono, the path of justice.
III. TRADITIONAL AND CUSTOMARY RIGHTS
Hawaiian customary practices have been recognized under Hawai'i law since
the earliest days of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The conversion in the Mahele
process from a communal land tenure system to a fee simple system in the mid-
1800s included a procedure by which Native Hawaiian tenants could claim title
to their house lots, plus any lands they had under cultivation. These lots are
called kuleana-meaning "right, title, portion" 39-and the law allowing native
tenant claims is known as the Kuleana Act.40 Section 7 of the Kuleana Act,
now codified as Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 7-1, provides that "the people
on each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood, house-
timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their
own private use."41 The deliberations of the 1850 Privy Council show that
38 The Hawai'i Supreme Court noted in Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County
Planning Commission (PASH) that the Kingdom of Hawai'i courts were specifically authorized
to cite and adopt "[t]he reasonings and analysis of the common law, and of the civil law [of
other countries] .. . so far as they are deemed to be founded in justice, and not in conflict with
the laws and usages of this kingdom." 79 Haw. 425, 437 n.21, 903 P.2d 1246, 1258 n.21
(1995) (citing Act to Organize the Judiciary (Sept. 7, 1847), ch. I, § 4 (emphasis added)).
Shortly thereafter, the Kingdom's legislature passed a resolution calling for the preparation of a
civil code, which provided that: "The Judges . .. are boundto proceed and decide according to
equity .... To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made .. . to received usage, and resort may
also be had to the laws and usages of other countries ... [not in] conflict with the laws and
customs of this kingdom." Id. (quoting CIVIL CODE OF THE HAWAIlAN ISLANDS ch. III, §§ 14,
823 (1859) (emphases added)). These provisions remained in effect until repealed in 1892 and
replaced with the predecessor of Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1. Id. (citing An Act to
Reorganize the Judiciary Department (Nov. 25, 1892), ch. LVII, § 5).
39 See MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL H. ELBERT, HAWAllAN DICTIONARY 179 (rev. ed.
1986).
40 Act of August 6, 1850, STATUTE LAWS OF His MAJESTY KAMEHAMEHA III, KING OF THE
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 202-04 (1850).
41 Section 7-1 states in full:
Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial titles to their lands,
the people on each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood,
house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their own
private use, but they shall not have a right to take such articles to sell for profit. The
people shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water, and the right of way.
The springs of water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in
fee simple; provided that this shall not be applicable to wells and watercourses, which
individuals have made for their own use.
HAw. REv. STAT. § 7-1 (2009).
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section 7 of the Kuleana Act was added at the insistence of the king, who was
concerned that "a little bit of land even with allodial title, if they [the people]
were cut off from all other privileges, would be of very little value.'A2
A second basis for traditional and customary rights is found in the Hawaiian
usage exception in Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 1-1, which declares the
"common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions,"
as the common law of Hawai'i, "except as otherwise expressly provided by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed
by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage."4A Hawai'i
courts have held that since this section is derived from an act approved on
November 25, 1892, "Hawaiian usage" means usage that predates November
25, 1892."
In 1978, Hawai'i voters adopted and added Article XII, section 7, to the state
constitution, reaffirming traditional and customary Hawaiian practices:
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally
exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by
ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the
Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such
rights.45
The committee reports and debates on the amendment indicate that it was
intended to be broadly construed and to cover a wide range of customary rights
and was not intended to "remove or eliminate any statutorily recognized rights
or any rights of native Hawaiians" but to "encompass all rights of native
Hawaiians such as access and gathering." 46
In a series of cases, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has interpreted these three
laws in relation to Native Hawaiian access and gathering practices. In the
42 3B Privy Council Record 681, 713 (1850). The Privy Council thus adopted the King's
suggestion: '[T]he proposition of the King, which he inserted as the seventh clause of the law,
a rule for the claims of the common people to go to the mountains, and the seas attached to their
own particular land exclusively, is agreed to[.]" Id.
4 HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (2009) (emphasis added).
4 State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 52 Haw. 472, 474-75, 479 P.2d 202, 204 (1970).
45 HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
46 Delegates to the 1978 Hawai'i Constitutional Convention proposing this amendment
declared: "The proposed new section reaffirms all rights customarily and traditionally held by
ancient Hawaiians. . .. [B]esides fishing rights, other rights for sustenance, cultural and
religious purposes exist. Hunting, gathering, access and water rights ... [were] an integral part
of the ancient Hawaiian civilization and are retained by its descendants." HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
COMM., STANDING COMM. REP. No. 57, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 637, 640 (1980) (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330, af'don reh'g,
55 Haw. 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973) (per curiam); Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95
(1968).
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1982 case Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., Chief Justice William S. Richardson,
writing for a unanimous court, held that gathering rights derive from both
Hawai'i Revised Statutes sections 7-1 and 1-1.48 The court stated that pursuant
to article XII, section 7 of the constitution, Hawai'i courts are obligated "to
preserve and enforce such traditional rights."4 9
The Kalipi court also laid out some limitations; in order to assert a right to
gather the items enumerated in section 7-1, an ahupua'a tenant must satisfy
three conditions: (1) physically reside within the ahupua'a; (2) gather on
undeveloped lands within the ahupua'a; and (3) gather for the purpose of
practicing Native Hawaiian customs.50 The court also recognized that section
1-1 ensures that other Native Hawaiian customs and practices not specifically
enumerated in section 7-1 may continue, "so long as no actual harm is done
thereby."5 1 It adopted a balancing test in which "the retention of a Hawaiian
tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the respective
interests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom has
continued in a particular area."5 2 Ten years later, in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court under Chief Justice Herman T.F. Lum53 held that
Native Hawaiian rights protected by article XII, section 7 may "extend beyond
the ahupua'a in which a native Hawaiian resides where such rights have been
customarily and traditionally exercised in this manner."5 4 The court clarified
that although customary rights under section 7-1 are limited to the ahupua'a in
which a native tenant lives, section 1-1's "'Hawaiian usage' clause may
establish certain customary Hawaiian rights beyond those found in section 7-
1."55
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Native
Hawaiians have standing to pursue their claims where their cultural practices
are adversely affected. This is exemplified in the first, and some would say the
most groundbreaking, of the Moon Court's traditional and customary rights
decisions, Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai'i County Planning
48 66 Haw. 1, 11-13, 656 P.2d 745, 751-52 (1982).
49 Id. at 4, 656 P.2d at 748.
'0 Id. at 7-9, 656 P.2d at 749-50.
51 Id. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751.
52 id.
5 The Pele Defense Fund v. Paty opinion was written byAssociate Justice Robert G. Klein.
See generally Kahikino Noa Dettweiler, Racial Classification or Cultural Identification?: The
Gathering Rights Jurisprudence of Two Twentieth Century Hawaiian Supreme Court Justices, 6
AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 174 (2005), for a discussion of several of the most important Native
Hawaiian rights cases decided by Chief Justice William S. Richardson and Associate Justice
Robert G. Klein.
54 73 Haw. 578, 620, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (1992).
" Id. at 618, 837 P.2d at 1270 (citing Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 9-10, 656 P.2d at 750).
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Commission (PASH),56 an opinion authored by Associate Justice Robert G.
Klein. In PASH, developer Nansay Hawaii had applied for a Special
Management Area (SMA) permit for a resort development on Hawai'i island,
and the shoreline organization Public Access Shoreline Hawaii (PASH)
requested a contested case hearing before the Hawai'i County Planning
Commission (HPC) to oppose the development.s" The HPC denied PASH's
request and approved the permit. 6 PASH filed suit, alleging that the HPC
violated Hawai'i Revised Statutes chapter 91, the Hawaii Administrative
Procedure Act.59 The trial court agreed with PASH, vacated the SMA permit,
and ordered the HPC to hold a contested case hearing and to include PASH as a
participant.60 The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to
PASH.6'
On appeal, the Hawai'i Supreme Court first examined whether the circuit
court had jurisdiction to consider PASH's appeal. This turned on whether all
the requirements of Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 91-14, which allows
appeals from a contested case hearing, had been met.62 The court first found
that the proceeding at issue was a contested case hearing because it determined
the "rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties" and was "required by
law."63 The court then concluded that the HPC's action was "a final decision
and order" such that deferral of review would deprive PASH of adequate
relief.64 A final requirement was that the claimant had followed the applicable
agency rules and participated in the contested case hearing.65 Here, the court
found that PASH testified against the grant of the SMA permit at the HPC's
public hearing and, pursuant to the HCP's rules, had requested and been denied
a formal contested case hearing.66 The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that
PASH was not formally granted leave to intervene in a contested case is not
dispositive because it did everything possible to perfect its right to appeal." 67
56 Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning Comm'n (PASH), 79 Haw. 425,
429, 903 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1995).
57 id
58 id.
s Id. at 430, 903 P.2d at 1251.
60 id
61 Id. The Intermediate Court of Appeals, however, found that the appeal by another party,
Angel Pilago, was appropriately dismissed by the circuit court, explaining that Pilago's
acknowledged interest in the proceeding was not a sufficiently "personal" interest "clearly
distinguishable from that of the general public." Id. (citations omitted).
62 Id. at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252.
61 Id. at 431-32, 903 P.2d at 1252-53.
6 Id. at 433, 903 P.2d at 1254.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 434, 903 P.2d at 1255.
67 Id.
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In addition to the above requirements, the claimant's legal interests must
have been injured; PASH needed to meet standing requirements. 68 The HPC
denied PASH's contested case hearing request because it found that PASH's
asserted interests were "substantially similar" to those of the general public. 6 9
The court began its discussion of standing by chastising the HPC for its
"restrictive interpretation of standing requirements."o In a footnote, the court
stated that:
The cultural insensitivity demonstrated by Nansay and the HPC in this case-
particularly their failure to recognize that issues relating to the subsistence,
cultural, and religious practices of native Hawaiians amount to interests that are
clearly distinguishable from those of the general public-emphasizes the need to
avoid "foreclos[ing] challenges to administrative determinations through
restrictive applications of standing requirements."
The court found that PASH had sufficiently demonstrated, through unrefuted
testimony, that its members, as Native Hawaiians who exercised traditional and
customary rights on undeveloped lands within the relevant ahupua'a, had
interests in the SMA permit that were clearly distinguishable from those of the
general public.72
After disposing of the jurisdictional questions, the court turned to the
substantive issues. Ultimately, the court determined that Native Hawaiians
retain rights to pursue traditional and customary activities because land patents
in Hawai'i confirm only a limited property interest when compared with land
patents in other jurisdictions.
Nansay Hawaii did not directly contest that traditional Hawaiian gathering
rights, including gathering food and fishing for '6pae, or shrimp, were
exercised on its land,74 but Nansay argued that "[w~hen the owner develops
land, the gathering rights disappear."75  The court rejected this argument,
holding instead that the HPC was "obligated to protect the reasonable exercise
8 Id. at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252.
69 Id. at 434, 903 P.2d at 1255.
70 Id.
7' Id. at 434 n.15, 903 P.2d at 1255 n.15 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted;
brackets in original).
72 Id. at 434, 903 P.2d at 1255.
7 Id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268.
74 Id. at 430 n.6, 903 P.2d at 1251 n.6 (noting that "[a]t the hearing before the [HPC],
Nansay did not directly dispute the assertion that unnamed members of PASH possess
traditional native Hawaiian gathering rights at Kohanaiki, including food gathering and fishing
for '[6]pae, or shrimp, which are harvested from the anchialline ponds located on Nansay's
proposed development site").
75 Second Supplemental Brief (Opening Brief) for Petitioner-Appellee-Appellant Nansay
Hawaii at 19, Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty. Planning Comm'n (PASH), 79
Haw. 425, 903 P.2d 1246 (1995) (No. 15460).
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of traditional and customary rights to the extent feasible under the Hawai'i
Constitution and relevant statutes." 6 The court traced the origins of Hawai'i
Revised Statutes section 1-1 to an 1847 act of Kamehameha III,77 allowing the
judiciary to adopt common law principles, provided they did not "conflict with
the laws and usages of this kingdom."7 8 The PASH court further stressed, "the
precise nature and scope of the rights retained by § 1-1 . .. depend upon the
particular circumstances of each case."
The court examined the extent to which section 1-1 preserved customary
practices, noting that Kalipi specifically refused to decide the "ultimate scope"
of traditional rights under that statute.80 The court also distinguished the
doctrine of custom in Hawai'i from English common law in several ways.
First, contrary to the "time immemorial" standard, traditional and customary
practices in Hawai'i must be established in practice by November 25, 1892.81
Second, continuous exercise of the right is not required, though the custom may
become more difficult to prove without it.82 The PASH court stated that "the
right of each ahupua'a tenant to exercise traditional and customary practices
remains intact, notwithstanding arguable abandonment of a particular site."83
The court set out a test for the doctrine of custom, requiring that a custom be
consistent when measured against other customs, 84 a practice be certain in an
objective sense, 5 and a traditional use be exercised in a reasonable manner.86
Defining the reasonable use requirement, the court further explained that the
balance leans in favor of establishing a use in the sense that "even if an
acceptable rationale cannot be assigned, the custom is still recognized as long
as there is no 'good legal reason' against it."87
While recognizing that in real property matters "the western concept of
exclusivity is not universally applicable in Hawai'i[,]" the court addressed
76 PASH, 79 Haw. at 437, 903 P.2d at 1258 (stating that "the HPC is obligated to protect
traditional and customary rights to the extent feasible under the Hawai'i Constitution and
relevant statutes").
n Id. at 437 n.21, 903 P.2d at 1258 n.21.
78 Id.
7 Id. at 438, 440, 903 P.2d at 1259, 1261 (quoting Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578,
619, 837 P.2d 1247, 1271 (1992)).
81 Id. at 439, 903 P.2d at 1260.
8 Id. at 447 n.39, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39.
8 Id. at 441 n.26, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26 (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271.
8 Id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted).
ss The court stated, "[A] particular custom is certain if it is objectively defined and applied;
certainty is not subjectively determined." Id. at 447 n.39, 903 P.2d at 1269 n.39 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
86 Id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Id. at 447 n.39, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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concerns that the ruling could lead to disruption, stating that "the non-
confrontational aspects of traditional Hawaiian culture should minimize
potential disturbances."8 8 The court also held that the State has the authority to
"reconcile competing interests";8 9 thus, "[d]epending on the circumstances of
each case, once land has reached the point of 'full development' it may be
inconsistent to allow or enforce the practice of traditional Hawaiian gathering
rights on such property."90 The PASH court cautioned, however, that
"[a]lthough access is only guaranteed in connection with undeveloped lands,
and article XII, section 7 [of the Hawai'i Constitution] does not require the
preservation of such lands, the State does not have the unfettered discretion to
regulate the[se] rights ... out of existence."91
The PASH court also clarified that descendents of Native Hawaiians who
inhabited the islands prior to 1778 "who assert otherwise valid customary and
traditional Hawaiian rights under HRS § 1-1 are entitled to protection
regardless of their blood quantum."9 2 The PASH court declined to decide,
however, whether descendants of non-Hawaiian citizens of the Hawaiian
Kingdom are entitled to such protection and expressly reserved comment on
whether non-Hawaiian members of an 'ohana or extended family may
legitimately claim traditional and customary rights protected by state law.93
In 1998, in a criminal case, the Hawai'i Supreme Court sought to clarify and
perhaps alleviate some of the concerns raised by the PASHdecision.9 4 In State
v. Hanapi, the court held that "it is the obligation of the person claiming the
exercise of a native Hawaiian right to demonstrate that the right is protected."
8 Id. at 447, 903 P.2d at 1268.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 451, 903 P.2d at 1272 (emphasis added).
91 Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at 441 n.26, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26 (stating that one
of the requirements for custom is that the use or right at issue is "obligatory or compulsory
(when established)"). The guidance provided in PASH was never applied on remand in that
case; the landowner withdrew its permit application and the proceedings were terminated.
Kevin Dayton, Resort Plan Contrasts with Initial Outcry, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 3, 2003,
available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2003/Oct/03/ln/IlnO4a.html.
92 PASH, 79 Haw. at 449, 903 P.2d at 1270.
9 Id. at 449 n.41, 903 P.2d at 1270 n.41.
94 The PASHdecision brought strong negative responses from private property interests and
state lawmakers. Dayton, supra note 91. See generally D. Kapua Sproat, Comment, The
Backlash Against PASH: Legislative Attempts to Restrict Native Hawaiian Rights, 20 U. HAW.
L. REv. 321 (1998); David M. Forman & Stephen M. Knight, Native Hawaiian Cultural
Practices Under Threat, 1 HAw. B.J. 1 (1998). See also David L. Callies & J. David Breemer,
Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public
Trust "Exceptions" and the (MIS) Use ofInvestment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV.
339, 354 (2003) (characterizing the Hanapi case as a "retreat from the broader language in
PASH, but ... a relatively minor one").
9s 89 Haw. 177, 184, 970 P.2d 485, 492 (1998).
459
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 33:44 7
The defendant, Alapa'i Hanapi, lived in the ahupua'a of 'Aha'ino, Moloka'i,
on property adjacent to two fishponds.9 6 The owner of the adjoining land had
graded and filled the area near the ponds, violating federal wetlands
regulations. 9 7 After complaints by Hanapi, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
allowed the landowner to conduct a voluntary, unsupervised restoration of the
property, subject to the oversight of a consultant/archaeologist." Hanapl
believed that the landowner's actions desecrated a "traditional ancestral cultural
site"99 and that it was his right and obligation as a Native Hawaiian to perform
religious and traditional ceremonies in order to heal the land.'00 Hanapi twice
entered the property without incident to observe and monitor the restoration.' 0
On a third visit, HanapT was ordered off the property; Hanapi refused and was
charged with second-degree criminal trespass.' 02
At trial, the district court rejected Hanapi's defense of privilege based upon
his constitutional rights as a Native Hawaiian. 0 3 The Hawai'i Supreme Court
affirmed Hanapi's conviction.'" The court recognized that "constitutionally
protected native Hawaiian rights, reasonably exercised, qualify as a privilege
for purposes of enforcing criminal trespass statutes." 05 The court then set out
three minimum requirements to successfully assert a defense based on a
constitutionally protected Native Hawaiian right. 06
First, a defendant must qualify as a Native Hawaiian as defined in PASH-a
descendant of Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778, regardless of
blood quantum.10 7 Second, a defendant must "establish that his or her claimed
right is constitutionally protected as a customary or traditional" Native
Hawaiian practice. 0 8 To establish the existence of a traditional or customary




't Id. at 181, 970 P.2d at 489.
'o' Id. at 178, 970 P.2d at 486.
102 Id. at 178-79, 970 P.2d at 486-87.
103 Id. at 179-81, 970 P.2d at 487-89.
'0 Id. at 185, 188, 970 P.2d at 493, 496.
'0 Id. at 184, 940 P.2d at 492.
106 Id. at 185-86, 970 P.2d at 493-94. A recent Hawai'i Supreme Court decision sets out the
analysis courts should apply once a defendant has met Hanapi's three minimum requirements.
State v. Pratt, 127 Haw. 206, 277 P.3d 300 (2012).
107 Hanapi, 89 Haw. at 186, 970 P.2d at 494.
108 Id. The court noted that, although some customary and traditional Native Hawaiian rights
are codified in article XI, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution, or in Hawai'i Revised Statutes
sections 1-1 and 7-1, "[tlhe fact that the claimed right is not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution or statutes[] does not preclude further inquiry concerning other traditional and
customary practices that have existed." Id. (citing Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i Cnty.
Planning Comm'n (PASH), 79 Haw. 425, 438, 903 P.2d 1246, 1259 (1995)) (emphasis
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practice, there must be an "adequate foundation in the record connecting the
claimed right to a firmly rooted traditional or customary native Hawaiian
practice." 09 This foundation can be laid through testimony of experts or
kama'iina witnesses"o as proof of ancient Hawaiian tradition, custom, and
usage."' Finally, a defendant must prove that "the exercise of the right
occurred on undeveloped or less than fully developed property." 2 The court
clarified PASH by holding that "if property is deemed 'fully developed,' i.e.,
lands zoned and used for residential purposes with existing dwellings,
improvements, and infrastructure, it is always 'inconsistent' to permit the
practice of traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights on such
property."" 3  The court, however, reserved the question of the status of
traditional and customary rights on less than fully developed property.114
Two years later, in the 2000 case, Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land Use
Commission (Ka Pa'akai), the Hawai'i Supreme Court provided an analytical
framework "to effectuate the State's obligation to protect native Hawaiian
customary and traditional practices while reasonably accommodating
competing private [property] interests."' 15 This case arose from the State Land
Use Commission's (LUC) reclassification of nearly 1010 acres of land in the
Ka'ipllehu ahupua'a on the island of Hawai'i from conservation to urban use
upon application by Ka'upulehu Developments (KD)."6 KD sought to develop
a luxury subdivision with upscale homes, a golf course, and other amenities." 7
The plaintiff, Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina, an association of Native Hawaiian
organizations, had participated in a contested case hearing on KD's application
before the LUC."'8 Ka Pa'akai argued that the traditional and customary
gathering rights of its members would be adversely affected by the
development."' 9 As in PASH, the court first examined the jurisdictional
requirements, specifically standing, for bringing an appeal under chapter 91 of
removed).
'0 Id. at 187, 970 P.2d at 495.
110 A kama'aina witness is "a person familiar from childhood with any locality." In re
Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 315 n.2, 440 P.2d 76, 77 n.2 (1968) (quoting In re Boundaries of
Pulehunui, 4 Haw. 239, 245 (1879)). Kama'5ina literally means "land child[,]" and refers to
one who is "[n]ative-born, one born in a place[.]" PUKUI & ELBERT, supra note 39, at 124.
'" Hanapi, 89 Haw. at 187, 970 P.2d at 495.
112 Id. at 186, 970 P.2d at 494 (citing PASH, 79 Haw. at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271).
113 Id. at 186-87, 970 P.2d at 494-95.
114 Id. at 187, 970 P.2d at 495 (citing PASH, 79 Haw. at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271).
us 94 Haw. 31, 46-47, 7 P.3d 1068, 1083-84 (2000).
... Id. at 34, 7 P.3d at 1071.
117 Id. at 36, 7 P.3d at 1073.
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 34-36, 7 P.3d at 107 1-73.
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the Hawai'i Revised Statutes. In determining that Ka Pa'akai had standing, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court recognized that,
[w]ith regard to native Hawaiian standing, this court has stressed that "the rights
of native Hawaiians are a matter of great public concern in Hawaii.". . . Our
"fundamental policy [is] that Hawaii's state courts should provide a forum for
cases raising issues of broad public interest, and that the judicially imposed
standing barriers should be lowered when the "needs of justice" would be best
served by allowing a plaintiff to bring claims before the court."l 20
On the merits, the court held that the LUC improperly delegated its
obligations under article XII, section 7, of the Hawai'i Constitution by placing
a condition in the reclassification order requiring KD to preserve and protect
Native Hawaiian gathering and access rights. 12 1 The court found this wholesale
delegation of responsibility to the developer "was improper and misses the
point. These issues must be addressed before the land is reclassified." 22
The court also held that the LUC's findings and conclusions were
insufficient to determine whether it fulfilled its obligation to preserve and
protect traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiians. The court
concluded that, as a matter of law, the LUC "failed to satisfy its statutory and
constitutional obligations." 2 3 The court held that the LUC should have, at a
minimum, made specific findings and conclusions regarding:
(1) the identity and scope of "valued cultural, historical, or natural resources" in
the petition area, including the extent to which traditional and customary native
Hawaiian rights are exercised in the petition area; (2) the extent to which those
resources-including traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights-will be
affected or impaired by the proposed action; and (3) the feasible action, if any, to
be taken by the LUC to reasonably protect native Hawaiian rights if they are
found to exist.' 24
The Moon Court also addressed Native Hawaiian traditional and customary
rights in other contexts.12 5 In August 2010, just a few weeks before his
retirement, Chief Justice Moon authored the majority opinion in the Hawai'i
Supreme Court's first case involving iwi kiipuna,126 or Native Hawaiian
120 Id. at 42, 7 P.3d at 1079 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 614-15, 837 P.2d
1247, 1268-69 (1992)).
121. Id. at 50, 7 P.3d at 1087.
122 id
123 Id. at 48, 7 P.3d at 1085.
124 Id. at 47, 7 P.3d at 1084 (internal footnotes omitted).
125 Two water use cases, In re Wai'ola o Moloka'i, 103 Haw. 401, 83 P.3d 664 (2004), and
In re Kukui (Moloka'i), Inc., 116 Haw. 481, 174 P.3d 320 (2007), discussed extensively
elsewhere in this issue, illustrate the court's adherence to the Ka Pa'akai guidelines.
126 See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 245-73, for a discussion of Native Hawaiian
beliefs and practices, as well as the laws, related to iwi kilpuna.
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ancestral remains. In Kaleikini v. Thielen, the O'ahu Island Burial Council
(OIBC), pursuant to the provisions of Hawai'i's burial law, Hawai'i Revised
Statutes chapter 6E, approved a burial treatment plan by landowner General
Growth Properties (GGP) allowing the disinterment and relocation of Native
Hawaiian burials at GGP's proposed project, Ward Villages Shops.12 7 Paulette
Kaleikini, a recognized cultural descendant of the iwi kilpuna in question,
attempted to challenge the decision of the OIBC and sought to have the iwi
preserved in place since a critical tenet of Native Hawaiian traditional and
customary practice requires "ensur[ing] that iwi remain undisturbed and ...
receive proper care and respect." 28
Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 6E-43(c) allows such decisions to "be
administratively appealed to a panel composed of three [burial] council
chairpersons and three members from [the Board of Land and Natural
Resources (BLNR)] as a contested case" pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes
chapter 91, the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act.12 9 Kaleikini submitted a
written request for a "contested case hearing," claiming that as "a recognized
cultural descendant ... and a possible lineal descendant"' 30 of the affected iwi
kilpuna, she had the right to a hearing under chapter 6E, its implementing
administrative regulations, and article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i
Constitution.' 3'
The BLNR chair denied the request for a contested case,132 and Kaleikini
filed two separate actions in state circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the
first action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to prevent the removal
of the iwi; Kaleikini's appeal was stayed as a result of GGP's bankruptcy.133
The second action was an appeal under chapter 91, seeking review of the denial
of Kaleikini's request for a contested case hearing.' 34 The circuit court also
dismissed Kaleikini's chapter 91 appeal, stating that it lacked jurisdiction
because Kaleikini had not participated in a contested case hearing, a
prerequisite to judicial review.135 The circuit court specifically noted the
"Catch 22" conundrum because "if you're denied a contested case hearing, and
the denial can't be appealed, then there is no way to get judicial review of that.
And any agency could improperly deny a contested case hearing."l36
127 124 Haw. 1, 5-6, 237 P.3d 1067, 1071-72 (2010).
128 Id. at 6, 237 P.3d at 1072.
129 HAW. REV. STAT. § 6E-43(c) (2009).
130 Kaleikini, 124 Haw. at 7, 237 P.3d at 1073.
131 Id. at 9, 237 P.3d at 1075.
32 Id. at 7, 237 P.3d at 1073.
3 Id. at 10 n.15, 237 P.3d at 1076 n.15.
134 Id. at 10, 237 P.3d at 1076.
135 Id. at 8, 237 P.3d at 1074.
136 Id.
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Nevertheless, the circuit court dismissed the case based on a 2006 Hawai'i
Supreme Court decision, Aha Hui Mdlama 0 Kaniakapupu v. Land Use
Commission,'3 7 which it interpreted as holding that actual participation in a
contested case hearing was a prerequisite to appealing an agency decision. 38
The Hawai'i Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, declaring
the case moot.139
In the Hawai'i Supreme Court, Kaleikini argued that her case was not moot,
and that the court should hear her appeal because it presented an issue of public
importance and fell within the "'capable of repetition yet evading review'
exception to the mootness doctrine."140 On the merits, she contended that
unlike the plaintiff in Kaniakapupu, she had requested a contested case hearing
but her request had been unlawfully denied.14 1 She argued that she was entitled
to the contested case hearing because of the language of Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 6E-43(c), the administrative rules implementing chapter 6E,
and article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i State Constitution, all of which
protected the traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiian ahupua'a
tenants.142 The State countered that although section 6E-43(c) did allow a
person aggrieved by the decision of a burial council to request a contested case
hearing, the administrative rule clarified the statute and provided that a
contested case hearing was necessary only if "required by law," and that the
BLNR chair had broad discretion to grant or deny such a request.143
On August 12, 2010, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled in Kaleikini's
favor.'" First, the majority opinion declared that although the case was indeed
moot-the iwi had already been removed-it was nevertheless appropriate for
the court to decide the case on the merits under the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine.14 5 A decision was necessary to answer a legal question
of great public importance and to guide public officials in the future.14 6
Pointing to the legislative history of Hawai'i's burial law, the court noted that
the Legislature specifically stated that "[t]he public has a vital interest in the
proper disposition of the bodies of its deceased persons, which is in the nature
of a sacred trust for the benefit of all." 47 In addition, the court cited the
1 111 Haw. 124, 139 P.3d 712 (2006).
13 Kaleikini, 124 Haw. at 8, 237 P.3d at 1074.
3 Id. at 11, 237 P.3d at 1077.
140 Id. at 12, 237 P.3d at 1078.
141 Id. at 11, 237 P.3d at 1077.
142 Id. at 17, 237 P.3d at 1083.
143 id
'4 Id. at 27, 237 P.3d at 1093. Justices Nakayama and Duffy joined the majority opinion,
and Justices Acoba and Recktenwald concurred separately in the judgment.
145 Id. at 13, 237 P.3d at 1079.
146 Id. at 12-13, 237 P.3d at 1078-79.
147 Id. at 13, 237 P.3d at 1079.
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Legislature's finding that "[N]ative Hawaiian traditional prehistoric and
unmarked burials are especially vulnerable and often not afforded the
protection of law which assures dignity and freedom from unnecessary
disturbance."l 4 8 These legislative pronouncements, the court said, "evince a
recognition of the public importance of the issue presented here, i.e., 'the
process of deciding to remove previously identified Native Hawaiian burial
sites."' 1 49 Thus, the court concluded that the question presented was of public
importance.'50
The court also recognized that a Native Hawaiian whose "legal interests stem
from her cultural and religious beliefs regarding the protection of the iwi"Ist
had standing. The court noted:
Throughout the instant litigation, Kaleikini has averred that her cultural and
religious beliefs require her to ensure that the iwi [are] left undisturbed and that
the OIBC's decision, allowing GGP to disinter the iwi, has caused her cultural
and religious injury. As such, we believe Kaleikini has alleged sufficient facts
upon which this court can determine she has standing.152
The majority then decided the merits in Kaleikini's favor. They agreed that
while the BLNR chair did have a certain level of discretion in deciding whether
to grant a petition for a contested case hearing, that discretion was limited to
determining whether the petitioner had met the proper procedural prerequisites
to obtain a hearing.'5 3 If so, as in the case of Kaleikini who had fulfilled all of
the procedural prerequisites, the chair had no discretion to deny the request for
a hearing. In reaching this result, the majority opinion relied upon the text of
section 6E-43 and the administrative rules implementing that section.154
The Moon Court's decision in Kaleikini will have a significant impact on the




'.. Id at 26, 237 P.3d at 1092.
152 Id. at 20-21, 237 P.3d at 1086-87.
153 Id. at 21, 237 P.3d at 1087. The court also discussed the holding in Bush v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission (Bush 1), 76 Haw. 128, 870 P.2d 1272 (1994), where Hawaiian Home
Lands beneficiaries had requested a contested case hearing to challenge agreements between
homestead lessees and third-parties for use of homestead land. The court distinguished Bush 1
because the specific language of the implementing rule at issue in Bush I did not require that a
contested case hearing be held. Id. at 18-19, 237 P.3d at 1084-85.
154 Id. at 17, 21, 237 P.3d at 1083, 1087. Justice Acoba concurred in the judgment but, inter
alia, would have reached the same result based on the state constitutional provision protecting
the traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiian ahupua'a tenants. Id. at 30-31, 237
P.3d at 1096-97 (Acoba, J., concurring). Justice Recktenwald also concurred but believed that
the circuit court had misinterpreted Aha Hui Millama OKaniakapupu v. Land Use Commission,
111 Haw. 124, 139 P.3d 712 (2006). Id. at 43, 237 P.3d at 1109 (Recktenwald, J., concurring).
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acknowledged the public interest in ensuring the protection ofNative Hawaiian
traditional and customary rights,'s but it also specifically recognized the
constitutional basis in article XII, section 7 for the protection of iwi kpuna.'16
Second, as a result of the court's decision, a cultural or lineal descendant
concerned about the proposed treatment of iwi will be able to request a
contested case hearing to challenge decisions to disinter and relocate iwi
klpuna.15 7
The Kaleikini decision, written by Chief Justice Moon himself, provides a
fitting closure to his judicial legacy. It illustrates the Moon Court's general
approach to Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights. That approach
has been characterized as giving full recognition to Native Hawaiian cultural
rights that existed prior to the institution of a fee-simple property rights regime
and insuring access to the courts so that those rights can be fully implemented.
In Ka Pa 'akai, the court established specific responsibilities for state agencies
to ensure the protection of traditional and customary rights.'5 8 The court has
repeatedly stated, beginning with PASH and then with Ka Pa 'akai and
Kaleikini, that Native Hawaiian rights are matters of great public importance in
Hawai'i and that Native Hawaiians must be allowed to assert their unique
interest in exercising cultural rights. Thus, in the area of traditional and
customary rights, the direction that Chief Justice Richardson first pointed to in
Kalipi'59 has been more fully explicated under the guidance of Chief Justice
Moon. In broadly construing traditional and customary rights to include not
only access and gathering, but also other cultural practices such as the
protection of iwi kipuna and the preservation of resources vital to practitioners,
the Moon Court has chosen to continue on Ke Ala Pono, the path of justice.
IV. THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACTI60
The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA), passed by Congress in
1921, set aside a portion of the Hawaiian Kingdom's Government and Crown
lands for Hawaiian homesteading.' 6 1 The contours of the HHCA, however,
were based on earlier actions of the Republic of Hawai'i and the United States.
Prior to annexation, the Republic had opened up some Government and Crown
. Id. at 13, 237 P.3d at 1079.
116 Id. at 26, 237 P.3d at 1092.
157 Id.
'5' Ka Pa'akai 0 Ka 'Aina v. Land Use Comm'n, 94 Haw. 31,45,7 P.3d 1068, 1082 (2000).
'5 Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
160 Some of the text in this section has appeared in HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at ch. 1.
161 HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 43.
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lands in a general homesteading program.16 2 A 1910 congressional amendment
to the Hawai'i Organic Act directed the Territory to open the Government and
Crown lands for homesteading in a given area when twenty-five or more
qualified homesteaders applied for land. 16 3 Since many sugar plantation leases
on these lands were due to expire during the 1920s and 1930s, sugar growers
were afraid that when the leases expired, choice sugar lands would be put into
homesteading under the 1910 amendment. Hawai'i's large plantation owners
feared that homesteading would destroy their thriving plantations. 164
During the same period, Hawaiian leaders became alarmed by the rapidly
deteriorating social and economic conditions of the Hawaiian people.'6 5 The
high rate of crime and juvenile delinquency as well as increased homelessness
within the Hawaiian community made it "evident that the remnant of
Hawaiians required assistance to stem their precipitous decline."1 66
These forces converged in 1921 to promote passage of the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act. Congress set aside approximately 203,000 acres of
Government and Crown lands to be leased to Native Hawaiians of not less than
fifty percent aboriginal blood at a nominal fee for ninety-nine years.'67 The
homesteading approach to rehabilitation
was consistent with long-established American and Hawaiian traditions. It was
further reinforced . . . by the suggestion that dispossessed Hawaiians would be
returning to the soil, going back to the cultivation of at least a portion of their
ancestral lands .... .
The sugar interests supported the HHCA because it carefully defined the
lands that Native Hawaiians could receive,169 which excluded forest reserves
and cultivated sugar cane lands. 17 0 Most homestead lands were arid and of
162 Land Act of 1895, 1895 Haw. Laws 48-83; see ROBERT H. HOROWITZ ET AL., PUBLIC
LAND POLICY IN HAWAII: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIs, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU REPORT
No. 5, at 5-15 (1969) (detailed analysis of the Act); VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 188-99
(discussing the 1895 Land Act).
16 An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141
(1900).
' ToM DINNELL ET AL., THE HAWAIIAN HOMES PROGRAM: 1920-1963, LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU REPORT No. 1, at 6 (1964).
165 See generally Davianna P6maika'i McGregor, 'fina Ho'opulapula: Hawaiian
Homesteading, 24 HAWAIIAN J. HisT. 1 (1990).
166 DINNELL ET AL., supra note 164, at 2-3.
167 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, §§ 203, 207, 208, 42 Stat.
108, 109-11 (1921).
168 DINNELL ET AL., supra note 164, at 7.
169 See McGregor, supra note 165, at 14-27.
170 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, § 203, 42 Stat. at 109-10 (1921). Also
excluded were lands under a homestead lease, right of purchase lease, or certificate of
occupation. Id.
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marginal value; many were actually lava rock.' 7 1 Moreover, while Hawaiian
leaders had originally proposed a bill making all Native Hawaiians eligible for
homesteading, the sugar growers, fearful that large numbers would demand
lands, maneuvered to have the blood quantum set at fifty percent.172
In 1959, when Hawai'i became a state, only 1673 Native Hawaiians had
received homesteads, with four house lots to every farm lot.173 An additional
2200 Native Hawaiians were on the homestead waiting list.17 4 Fifty years later,
9748 Native Hawaiians lease 45,566 acres of Hawaiian homestead land while
26,170 Native Hawaiians remain on the waiting list. 75
Section 4 of the Hawai'i Admission Act required the State to adopt the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as part of its constitution.'76 Section 4 also
provides that the United States must approve any amendments to the Act
altering the qualifications for or diminishing the benefits to beneficiaries. 177
Moreover, under the HHCA, Congress retains the power to alter, amend, or
repeal any of its provisions.'7 8  Thus, although primary responsibility for
administration of the program was transferred to the State as a condition of
statehood, the federal government also retains significant responsibility for the
HHCA.
In 1982, Chief Justice William S. Richardson in Ahuna v. Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands established that the State should be held to the "high
1' See ALLEN A. SPrrz, LAND ASPECTS OF THE HAWAIIAN HOMES PROGRAM, LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU REPORT No. 1 B, at 19-26 (1964).
172 See KEHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY (2008) for an in-depth analysis and discussion of the blood
quantum restrictions of the HHCA. See generally M.M. Vause, The Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act, History and Analysis (June 1962) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Hawai'i) for a discussion of factors leading to passage of the HHCA and blood quantum
limitations.
'7 SPITZ, supra note 171, at 17.
174 1980-81 DEPT. OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS ANN. REP., 'ANA Ho'OPULAPULA, at 8.
"7 2009 DEPT. OF HAWAllAN HOME LANDS ANN. REP. 29 (homestead awards); DEP'T OF
HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS APPLICANT SUMMARY AS OF JUNE 30,2011, at 5 (applicants), available
at http://www.hawaiianhomelands.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2011-06-30_01-
OahuWaitlist-I 53pgs.pdf.
176 Admission Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 4, 73 Stat. 4, provides, in part: "As a
compact with the United States relating to the management and disposition of Hawaiian home
lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, ... shall be adopted as a provision of the
Constitution of said State .... "
177 Admission Act § 4 provides: "[A]ny amendment to increase the benefits to lessees of
Hawaiian home lands may be made in the constitution, or in the manner required for State
legislation, but the qualifications of lessees shall not be changed except with the consent of the
United States."
178 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, § 223, 42 Stat. 108, 115
(1921) provides: "The Congress of the United States reserves the right to alter, amend, or repeal
the provisions of this title."
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fiduciary duties normally owed by a trustee to its beneficiaries."1 79 The opinion
added that the State should be judged by "the most exacting fiduciary
standards."180 These duties included the duty to act solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries and to exercise reasonable care and skill in dealing with trust
property.' 8 ' Chief Justice Richardson's Ahuna opinion and the trust standards
he established continue to impact not only Hawaiian Home Lands cases but
also those related to the public land trust.182
During the tenure of Chief Justice Moon, beneficiaries of the Hawaiian
Home Lands trust were able to continue turning to the courts to enforce the
HHCA's provisions. The court also allowed beneficiaries who had been
involved in a failed administrative process to address individual breach of trust
claims to file their claims in state circuit court. Finally, the court more clearly
defined the extent of the State's jurisdiction and control over HHCA trust
lands.
In the 1995 case Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, an
unincorporated association of Native Hawaiian beneficiaries over the age of
seventy who had been on the homestead pastoral waiting list for decades, some
since 1952, sued the Hawaiian Homes Commission (HHC) and the Department
of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL), the state administrative agency responsible
for implementing the HHCA.183 The Aged Hawaiians sought the opportunity
to lease pastoral lands for commercial ranching.18 4 Through a series of
actions-including adopting a policy granting pastoral lots of no more than 100
acres for subsistence ranching,'8 5 denying the request for a contested case
hearing by one of the original plaintiffs,' 86 and adopting a ten-premise guideline
for the allocation of pastoral land' 87-the HHC tried to implement a pastoral
homestead plan to distribute small pastoral lots. 88 The Aged Hawaiians filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, inter alia, alleged that the HHC, under color
of state law, had deprived them of due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by failing to provide them with a
reasonable opportunity to obtain a pastoral homestead award large enough to
support commercial ranching.189  After considering this factually and
'9 64 Haw. 327, 338, 640 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1982).
"so Id. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1169 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,
296-97 (1942)) (emphasis omitted).
... Id. at 340, 640 P.2d at 1169.
182 See infra Part V.B.
183 78 Haw. 192, 197, 891 P.2d 279, 284 (1995).
184 Id. at 195-97, 891 P.2d at 282-84.
"s Id. at 195-96, 891 P.2d at 282-83.
16 Id. at 196-97, 891 P.2d at 283-84.
187 Id. at 196, 891 P.2d at 283.
188 Id. at 197-98, 891 P.2d at 284-85.
189 Id. at 201, 891 P.2d at 288 (citing to both the HHCA and Hawai'i Revised Statutes
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procedurally complex case, the Hawai'i Supreme Court decided that the HHC
had violated the Aged Hawaiians' due process rights.'90
The court first held that beneficiaries of the federal-state compact "contained
in the Hawaii Admission Act and [which] incorporates HHCA trust
obligations" may bring claims under section 1983.191 The court stated that the
federal-state compact limits the way Hawai'i may manage Hawaiian Home
Lands and that "Congress enacted. . . a federal public trust, which by its nature
creates a federally enforceable right for its beneficiaries to maintain an action
against the trustee in breach of the trust."l 92 The court then concluded that "the
HHCA and the Admission Act impose a binding obligation on the State"' 9 ' and
that "the judiciary is authorized to enforce the relevant terms of the Admission
Act and the HHCA in the instant case."l 94
After determining that the Aged Hawaiians could sue under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the court turned to the merits of the due process claim. The court noted
that a fundamental requirement for a successful due process claim is the
deprivation of a property interest.'" The court concluded that HHCA
beneficiaries on the homestead waiting list are entitled to homestead awards;
that a "property interest" includes benefits that one is entitled to receive by
statute; and that the Aged Hawaiians' claims were based on valid property
interests.
The court then reviewed the specific procedures required to satisfy due
process, balancing: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures actually used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards; and
(3) the governmental interest, including the burden that additional procedural
safeguards would entail.'9 7 The court concluded that the balance of interests
tilted in favor of the beneficiaries based on "the procedural infirmities that have
already taken place"'9 8 and determined that beneficiaries on the pastoral waiting
chapter 91).
190 Id. at 195, 213, 891 P.2d at 282, 300.
'9' Id. at 213, 891 P.2d at 300.
192 Id. at 206, 891 P.2d at 293 (quoting Price v. Akaka (Akaka l), 3 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Id. at 208, 891 P.2d at 295.
194 Id. at 208-09, 891 P.2d at 295-96.
195 Id. at 211, 891 P.2d at 298 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Haw.
64, 68, 881 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1994)).
196 Id. at 211, 891 P.2d at 298.
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list were entitled to contested case hearings to consider their applications for
pastoral lot awards of sufficient acreage for commercial ranching activities.!
The court concluded that the Aged Hawaiians were entitled, as a matter of
law, to summary judgment on their due process claims because the HHC had
failed to adequately consider the Aged Hawaiians' acknowledged desire for
land sufficient to engage in commercial ranching.200 Although beneficiaries on
the pastoral wait list were "not entitled to 'economic units' per se," the court
determined that they must be given the "opportunity to seek such an award
prior to the implementation of a pastoral homestead lot award plan."2 01
In another complex case, Bush v. Watson, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled
that the practice of allowing Hawaiian Home Lands lessees to lease their
homestead lands to non-Hawaiians violated the HHCA.202 From 1980 to 1992,
non-Hawaiian farmers entered into third-party agreements (TPAs) with Native
Hawaiian lessees on Moloka'i, where the non-Hawaiian third parties contracted
to use the lessees' crop acres for farming or pastoral purposes in return for
monthly payments ranging from $120 to $200.203 Four Native Hawaiian
beneficiaries filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaration that
the TPAs approved by the HHC were contrary to the HHCA and therefore
illegal.20 4
Before determining the legality of the TPAs, the court addressed three
jurisdictional challenges: standing, claim preclusion/resjudicata, and sovereign
immunity.205 Finding that "standing barriers should be lowered in cases of
public interest under ourjurisdiction," the court applied the three-part "injury-
in-fact" test from Pele Defense Fund v. Paty.20 6 The court held that appellants
'9 Id. at 213, 891 P.2d at 300.
200 id.
201 Id. (emphasis in original).
202 Bush v. Watson (Bush II), 81 Haw. 474, 487, 918 P.2d 1130, 1143 (1996). In Bush v.
Hawaiian Homes Commission (Bush 1), 76 Haw. 128, 870 P.2d 1272 (1994), the Hawai'i
Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal by homestead beneficiaries who
challenged TPAs through the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 91 of the Hawai'i
Revised Statutes, because the beneficiaries had not "participated" in a contested case hearing
even though the beneficiaries had requested a contested case hearing. Id. at 134, 870 P.2d at
1278. In Bush I, the court reviewed whether there was a statutory, rule-based, or
constitutionally-mandated requirement for a contested case hearing and determined that there
was no such requirement. Id. at 134-36, 870 P.2d at 1278-80. The court left open the
possibility of challenging the HHCA's approval of the TPAs through other means. Id. at 137,
870 P.2d at 1281; see also Kaleikini v. Thielen, 124 Haw. 1, 18-19, 237 P.3d 1067, 1084-85
(2010) (discussing the Bush I holding).
203 Bush 11, 81 Haw. at 477, 918 P.2d at 1133.
204 Id. at 477-78, 918 P.2d at 1133-34.
20s See id. at 479-82, 918 P.2d at 1135-38.
206 Id. at 479, 918 P.2d at 1135 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 594, 837 P.2d
1247, 1258 (1992)). The test requires that (1) the plaintiff suffer an actual or threatened injury
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adequately established grounds for standing because "the HHC's approval of
the TPAs has injured trust beneficiaries by allowing non-Hawaiian third parties
to acquire large parcels of homestead lots[,] ... [thereby] unduly burden[ing]
the Appellants' commercial farming interests." 2 07 Secondly, "these injuries
[were] traceable to the HHC's approval of the TPAs," and finally, "invalidation
of the TPAs would allow the Appellants to pursue commercially viable farming
efforts."20 s
Next, the court examined whether the beneficiaries' claims were precluded
by parallel federal litigation2 0 9 raising identical challenges to the TPAs.2 '0 The
court found that the federal litigation did not preclude the beneficiaries'
claims 2 1 because the federal case did not address the allegation that the TPAs
violated the HHCA, did not reach the merits of the dispute, and did not involve
the same parties or their privities. 2 12 Consequently, appellants' claims were not
barred by res judicata.2 13
In examining the State's sovereign immunity defense, the court again turned
to Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,2 14 stating that "[i]f the relief sought against a
state official is prospective in nature, then the relief may be allowed regardless
of the state's sovereign immunity . . 2 15 Finding that there would be "no
direct and unavoidable effect on the state treasury" 216 and that voiding the
TPAs would not render the State liable to the contracting parties since each
TPA contained an indemnity provision protecting DHHL from liability,217 the
court held that sovereign immunity did not bar the beneficiaries' claims.2 18
resulting from the defendant's wrongful conduct; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant's actions; and (3) a favorable decision would likely provide relief for the injury. Id.
207 Id. at 479, 918 P.2d at 1135.
208 id.
209 Han v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 45 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1995).
210 Bush II, 81 Haw. at 478-79, 918 P.2d at 1134-35 (citing Han v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 824
F. Supp. 1480 (D. Haw. 1993), aff'd, 45 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1995)).
211 Id. at 480, 918 P.2d at 1136.
212 Id. The court found the HHC's argument that Han should be preclusive because
Appellants Bush and Kahae participated as amici in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit unpersuasive
because they did not "control the course of the proceedings" nor were "any of the plaintiffs in
Han representative of any of the Appellants in the instant case." Id. at 480-81, 918 P.2d at
1136-37.
213 See id. at 481, 918 P.2d at 1137.
214 73 Haw. 578, 609-10, 837 P.2d 1247, 1266-67 (1992) (applying Exparte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908)).
215 Bush II, 81 Haw. at 481, 918 P.2d at 1137 (quoting PeleDef Fund, 73 Haw. at 609-10,
837 P.2d at 1266) (emphasis added).
216 id
217 Id. at 482, 918 P.2d at 1138. In making this finding, the court expressly declined to
adopt the federal courts' "narrow view" that a claim for relief based on past illegal action is
necessarily "retrospective," as such an interpretation would pose an "onerous burden on
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After addressing all of the jurisdictional issues, the court turned to the merits.
The appellants alleged that the TPAs violated section 208(5)219 of the HHCA,
which prohibits lessees from transferring or holding their leasehold for the
benefit of anyone except a Native Hawaiian beneficiary and prohibits lessees
from subleasing their parcels.2 2 0 The State argued that the TPAs were mere
licenses, which did not create property interests.2 2'
The court noted it was clear that "compared with ordinary leaseholders,
Hawaiian homestead lessees do not possess all of the 'sticks in the bundle of
rights commonly characterized as property."',22 2 Looking to cases decided by
the territorial courts for guidance,223 the court found the specific terms and
nature of the agreement should be closely examined to determine "whether it
potential claimants." Id. at 482 n.9, 918 P.2d at 1138 n.9. Instead, the court focused its inquiry
on whether the relief sought for a past violation of law was "tantamount to an award of
damages" or would merely have an "ancillary" effect on the state treasury. Id. at 481, 918 P.2d
at 1137.
218 Id. at 483, 918 P.2d at 1139.
219 Under this provision, a lessee does not possess the right to "transfer to, or otherwise hold
for the benefit of, any another person ... except a native Hawaiian or Hawaiians, and then only
upon the approval of the department . . . [or to] sublet the [lessee's] interest in the tract or
improvements thereon." Id. at 484, 918 P.2d at 1140. Moreover, pursuant to Hawai'i
Administrative Rules (H.A.R.) section 10-3-35, lessees are prohibited from "entering into any
contract, joint venture, agreement or other arrangement of any sort with a third person on lands
covered by the lessee's lease for the cultivation of crops or the raising of livestock without the
approval of the HHC." Id.
220 id
221 Id. at 482-83, 918 P.2d at 1138-39.
222 Id. at 484, 918 P.2d at 1140 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
The court found that although some of the relevant agreements were discussed in Bush v.
Hawaiian Homes Commission (Bush 1), 76 Haw. 128, 136, 870 P.2d 1272, 1280 (1994), that
court only determined that due process does not require a hearing in a request for approval of a
TPA because such proceedings do not involve the potential deprivation of any "property
interest" held by the lessee under the HHCA and H.A.R. Bush II, 81 Haw. at 484, 918 P.2d at
1140. The court did not, however, effect a "definitive interpretation" of TPAs, nor were its
findings in Bush I equivalent to a finding that TPAs approved by the HHC do not convey
property interests. Id.
223 Bush I, 81 Haw. at 485, 918 P.2d at 1141. The court looked to a similar case, Territory
v. Tsunekichi, 23 Haw. 813 (1917), in which a lessee was charged with unlawfully removing
sugar cane from his homestead by allowing a milling company to enter and, for a fee, remove
sugar cane, subject to a mortgage between the lessee and the sugar company. BushlI, 81 Haw.
at 485, 918 P.2d at 1141. That court considered the agreement to be an "executory contract,"
but it did not reflect intent to transfer title, and thus did not constitute an illegal mortgage of the
lessee's interest. Id. The court also noted In re Henderson, 21 Haw. 104 (1912), in which the
territorial supreme court reversed a circuit court's order directing issuance of a land patent to the
lessee because he had illegally assigned a portion of his interest in the land to a sugar company
by entering into an agreement. Id. at 485-86, 918 P.2d at 1141-42.
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,,224
complies with statutory restrictions. In examining the nature of the TPAs,
the court noted that it would not be limited by the name the parties have given
the agreement and that authority exists for construing a "mere license" as an
"interest in land."22 5 The court ultimately found that the TPAs transferred "at
least a portion of the lessees' extant interests in their homesteads," and
provided a "right of entry (allowing non-Hawaiian third parties to cultivate
crops and raise livestock on homestead lands)"226 that was repugnant to the
HHCA.227
The Hawai'i Supreme Court's 2006 ruling in Kalima v. State22 8 is another
example of the Moon Court's rejection of jurisdictional barriers in order to
ensure access to the courts and, ultimately, a measure of justice for Native
Hawaiians. In 1999, three individual plaintiffS2 29 in the Kalima case brought a
class action lawsuit against the State and state officials on behalf of 2721
claimants and beneficiaries of the Hawaiian Home Lands trust,2 30 alleging
breaches of trust from August 21, 1959, when Hawai'i was admitted as a state,
to June 30, 1988.231 The plaintiffs argued that the State's mismanagement of
the trust resulted in actual damages to individual beneficiaries; their claims
included: "(1) mismanagement of the extensive waiting list; (2) mishandling of
the plaintiffs' applications; (3) preference policies regarding eligibility
requirements; and (4) the awarding of raw lands lacking infrastructure.",23 2
As part of the State's attempt to "address criticisms of the Hawaiian [H]ome
[L]ands program and provide redress to its beneficiaries," 233 the 1988 Hawai'i
State Legislature passed Act 395,234 providing a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity for trust beneficiaries to pursue claims for trust breaches arising after
July 1, 1988.235 Although the Act also gave beneficiaries the right to sue
retroactively, 236 due to the potential impact on the state treasury, the Governor
224 Bush II, 81 Haw. at 486, 918 P.2d at 1142.
225 id.
226 Id. at 487, 918 P.2d at 1143.
227 id.
228 Ill Haw. 84, 137 P.3d 990 (2006).
229 The individual plaintiffs were Leona Kalima, Dianne Boner, and Joseph Ching. Ching
passed away during the course of litigation and was represented in the appeal by Raynette
Nalani Ah Chong, special administrator of Ching's estate. Id. at 94, 137 P.3d at 1000.
230 Id. at 86, 137 P.3d at 992.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 88, 137 P.3d at 994.
234 Act ofJune 17, 1988, No. 395, 1988 Haw. Sess. Laws 942 (codified as amended at HAw.
REv. STAT. ch. 673 (1993 & Supp. 2010)).
235 Kalima, Ill Haw. at 88, 137 P.3d at 994.
236 Id.
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237
was allowed to propose a resolution of such claims. As a result, the 1991
Legislature passed Act 323, codified as Hawai'i Revised Statutes chapter 674,
which established a panel to receive and review the claims of individual trust
beneficiaries arising between statehood and June 30, 1988,238 and set forth
deadlines for beneficiaries' claims.239
In 1997, in its first major substantive report on claims to the Governor and
the Legislature,240 the panel stated that 2752 claimants had filed a total of 4327
claims.2 4 1 The panel categorized about sixty-seven percent of the total claims
as "waiting list claims"-claims alleging an unreasonably long wait for a
homestead award.242 The panel had made final decisions on 172 claims,
finding 165 of those claims meritorious and recommending approximately $6.7
million in damages.2 4 3 The panel also requested a two-year extension to review
the rest of the claims. 2 "
The State Administration and Legislature, however, questioned the panel's
damages formula and wanted to review all of the claims together before
awarding any damages.245 Thus, the Legislature did not act on the claims, but
passed Act 382 establishing a "Working Group" 246 to "determine a formula and
237 id.
238 Id. at 90, 137 P.3d at 996. The panel was required to:
[R]eceive, review, and evaluate the merits of an individual beneficiary's claim, and to
submit a summary of the findings and an advisory opinion regarding the merits of each
claim filed with the Panel, including an estimate of the probable award of actual damages
or recommended corrective action to the 1993 and 1994 Legislatures.
Id. at 89, 137 P.3d at 995 (citing H. CoNF. COMM. REP. No. 64, in 1991 H. JOURNAL, at 801
(Haw. 1991)).
239 Id. at 89, 137 P.3d at 995. Claimants were required to: (1) submit all claims to the panel
by August 31, 1993; (2) file a written notice with the panel that the claimant does not accept
legislative action on his or her claim by October 1, 1994; and (3) file an action in circuit court
by September 30, 1996. Id. at 90, 137 P.3d at 996. Due to delays in naming panel members,
the 1993 Legislature added two years to the initial claims filing deadline and extended other
deadlines by three years. Id. Hence, the new deadline for filing claims with the panel was
August 31, 1995. Id. The new deadline for filing written notices with the panel rejecting
legislative action was set at October 1, 1997. Id. The new deadline for a claimant to file a suit
in circuit court was set at September 30, 1999. Id. The Legislature also gave the panel more
time to submit its final report, extending the deadline from 1994 to 1997. Id.
240 Id. at 91, 137 P.3d at 997.
241 Id. Of these claims, 3931 were accepted for investigation, 396 were closed, and "601
claims were concluded and in various stages of disposition." Id.
242 Id. The panel categorized forty-two percent of claims as only "waiting list claims." Id.
An additional twenty-five percent were claims that were "waiting list claims with other issues,"




246 Id. at 92, 137 P.3d at 998. Members of the Working Group included the State Attorney
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any criteria necessary to qualify and resolve claims" filed under chapter 674.247
Act 382 gave the panel two more years to review claimS24 8 and also specified
that its passage did not trigger a claimant's right to sue.2 49 After months of
meetings, a majority of the Working Group proposed a formula eliminating
250
sixty percent of the claims, most of which were waiting list claims. In
response, several claimants filed suit, and a state circuit court struck down
portions of Act 382 as violating the claimants' due process rights.25 1
After the circuit court's decision, the only portions of Act 382 that remained
in effect extended the panel's life and required a final report to the 1999
Legislature, set an October 1, 1999 deadline for claimants to reject legislative
action on their claims, and extended the deadline to file an action in court to
December 31, 1999.252
The panel reported to the 1999 Legislature that it had completed forty-seven
percent of all claims 25 3 and recommended cumulative damages totaling almost
$16.5 million.254 At the panel's request, the 1999 Legislature agreed to extend
the panel's life by another year, but then-Governor Ben Cayetano vetoed the
legislation.25 5
The panel's final report to the Legislature in late 1999 indicated that it had
reviewed fifty-three percent of all claims 256 and recommended damages of a
little over $1.5 million for sixty-nine newly reported claims.257 The panel had
also switched its focus from reviewing claims to notifying claimants of the
October 1, 1999 notice-filing deadline.2 58 By the deadline, the panel had
received written notices in 2592 claims,259 including one from the Native
Hawaiian Legal Corporation, a public interest law firm advocating for Native
Hawaiians, on behalf of all claimants who had not yet filed notices.260
General, the Director of Budget and Finance, the Chair of the Hawaiian Homes Commission,
and the panel chair.
247 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
248 Id. The panel then had until 1999 to review the claims.
249 id.
250 id.
251 Id. The circuit court also enjoined Working Group members from "taking any further
action in determining the formula for compensation." Id.
252 id.
253 Id. at 92-93, 137 P.3d at 998-99.






260 Id. The three individual plaintiffs in Kalima v. State also filed a complaint in federal
district court on September 30, 1999, alleging, inter alia, violations of equal protection and due
process. Id. at 93 n.12, 137 P.3d at 999 n.12 (citing Kalima v. Cayetano, No. CV 99-00671
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On December 29, 1999, the plaintiffs261 filed an action in circuit court,
alleging, inter alia, that chapter 674 gave them a right to sue for damages
caused by the State's breaches of trust.26 2 The State argued that chapter 674
created a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and that the waiver had either
"expired or lapsed before the conditions or prerequisites of the waiver were
satisfied."2 63 Ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment,
the circuit court determined that it had jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs had
exhausted their administrative remedies, timely commenced their action in
court, and were "aggrieved individual claimants," as defined in chapter 67 4 .26
The court held that the plaintiffs had a right to pursue their claims and had
fulfilled all the prerequisites to do so; additionally, the court determined that the
State had waived its sovereign immunity.265
The State appealed,266 and on June 30, 2006, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
affirmed.267 The court began its analysis by detailing the procedures set forth in
chapter 674.268 Since chapter 674 established a process to resolve claims for
past breaches of trust, the court believed that the entire chapter was remedial in
nature and should be construed liberally.269 The court additionally determined,
HG-LEK (D. Haw. 1999)). The district court, however, eventually dismissed the case without
prejudice. Id.
261 While all the plaintiffs filed claims with the panel before the 1995 deadline, the plaintiffs
were at various stages of the administrative process. Id. at 94, 137 P.3d at 1000. The panel had
already adjudicated and processed the claims of 418 plaintiffs, but the Legislature had not
provided these claimants any relief. Id. at 94 n.13, 137 P.3d at 1000 n.13. Raynette Ah Chong,
Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Ching, represented this group. Id. Fifty-three plaintiffs,
represented by Dianne Boner, had received advisory opinions from the panel, but these opinions
had not yet been submitted to the Legislature. Id. Lastly, 2250 plaintiffs, represented by Leona
Kalima, had filed their claims with the panel, but had not yet received an advisory opinion. Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 95, 137 P.3d at 1001.
264 Id. at 96, 137 P.3d at 1002.
265 Id. at 95-96, 137 P.3d at 1001-02. Moreover, the circuit court ruled that a 1995 law
exempting the chapter 674 process from a global settlement of trust claims constituted an
agreement binding the State and that plaintiffs could thus sue the State for breach of contract
under Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 661-1. Id. at 96, 137 P.3d at 1002.
266 Id. at 97, 137 P.3d at 1003. The State challenged the circuit court's finding that the State
had waived its sovereign immunity for damages, breach of trust, and breach of contract, as well
as the circuit court's rejection of the State's alternative argument that the plaintiffs' right to sue
had expired or lapsed. Id.
267 Id. at 107, 137 P.3d at 1013. The Hawai'i Supreme Court determined, however, that the
circuit court erred when it granted the plaintiffs "the right to sue for breach of contract" under
Hawai'i Revised Statutes chapter 661. Id. at 112, 137 P.3d at 1018.
268 Id. at 98-100, 137 P.3d at 1004-06.
269 Id. at 100, 137 P.3d at 1006.
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however, that since the right-to-sue provision in chapter 674 was "part and
parcel of a waiver of sovereign immunity," it should be strictly interpreted.270
The court first considered whether the plaintiffs' claims were barred by
sovereign immunity. 2 71 The parties agreed that section 674-16 was "a specific
waiver of the State's sovereign immunity and a consent to be sued for money
damages for breaches of trust occurring between August 21, 1959 and June 30,
1988."272 They also agreed that a claimant must have first complied with
chapter 674's procedural requirements before gaining the right to sue.273 The
parties disagreed, however, "on the conditions of that waiver and whether the
plaintiffs [had] met all of Chapter 674's requirements., 2 74 To evaluate the
merits of these arguments, the court examined whether the plaintiffs had met all
the requirements of chapter 674's waiver of immunity,2 7 5 including whether the
plaintiffs were "aggrieved individual claimant[s]."276
The State argued that individual claimants must have completed the entire
277
administrative process before gaining the right to sue. The plaintiffs
countered that the statute only required (1) timely filing with the panel; (2)
timely notice rejecting legislative action on claims; and (3) timely filing in
circuit court.2 7 8 The State insisted that the plaintiffs' claims were untimely
because panel review and legislative 'action' upon each claim were "additional
conditions precedent to the right to sue that were not completed prior to the
statutory deadlines."279
The Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected the State's arguments, holding that both
panel review and action by the Legislature were timely completed.280 The court
reasoned that the panel conducted an initial review to determine which of the
4327 timely filed claims to close or accept.28 1 It then reviewed the accepted
claims once more, and each claim that passed the investigation stage moved on
to a final review and "determination of its probable merit and award of
damages and/or corrective action., 2 8 2 Hence, the pending claims were the
270
271 Id. at 100-01, 137 P.3d at 1006-07.
272 Id. at 101, 137 P.3d at 1007.
273 id.
274 id.
275 Id. In considering how it would review the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the
court determined that "a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal
and must be strictly construed." Id.
276 id.
277 id.
278 Id. at 102, 137 P.3d at 1008.
279 id.
280 Id. at 102-06, 137 P.3d at 1008-12.
211 Id. at 103-04, 137 P.3d at 1009-10.
282 id.
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subject of an "on-going review process." 2 83 The court concluded that "[a]t the
very least, we believe the accepted-claims were 'reviewed' each time the Panel
prepared and submitted a report to the Legislature." 2 4
The court next addressed "whether the legislature 'acted' upon each claim
reported by the panel in its Final Report, thereby triggering the plaintiffs' right
to sue" under chapter 674.285 The State argued that according to the plain
language and the legislative history of section 674-17, legislative action did not
result from the Legislature's decision to defer action.286 The court found that
the legislative history and statutory construction of chapter 674 supported the
conclusion that "the legislature's 'deferral' of its consideration of the Panel's
recommendations after expiration of the statutory deadlines . .. was effectively
... a denial of all claims, and, therefore an 'action' upon each claim." 287 The
court explained that the State Senate, throughout the legislative process, had
pushed for claimants to have a right to sue in court.2 8 8 Even though an
administrative step was added to the claims process, "the ultimate decision
rested with the claimants as to whether the resolution of their claim by the
administrative process was acceptable."28 9 If the court required the Legislature
"to do some affirmative 'act,' then the Legislature's 'deferral' of its actions
until the applicable deadlines had passed would nullify [the judicial process] of
the statute, leaving the plaintiffs with no remedy whatsoever." 2 90 The court
deemed this result "absurd" in light of the purpose of the statute and the labors
of the Legislature to meet this purpose. 291 The court reasoned that the
Legislature desired to give claimants the right to sue, or else it would have
expressly stated limitations in chapter 674 "and [would] not [have] left the
choice to accept legislative relief in the hands of the claimants." 292
283 Id. at 104, 137 P.3d at 1010. According to the court, there was an ongoing review
process because: "[F]or purposes of providing a status report to the legislature, the pending
accepted-claims were necessarily required to be reviewed in order to report them (1) in an
appropriate category, e.g., 'hearings pendings,' [sic] 'settlement negotiations,' 'on remand to




287 Id. at 105, 137 P.3d at 1011. The court had pointed out earlier that chapter 674 did not
define "action," nor did it provide an "inclusive time period for any type of 'action,' other than
the ultimate deadline of December 31, 1999, when a claimant must bring suit or be forever
barred." Id. at 104-05, 137 P.3d at 1010-11.




292 Id. The court also ruled that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not postponed until
the governor examined the effect of the claims. Id
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The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs preserved their rights by timely
filing notice rejecting legislative action and then filing suit before the October
1, 1999 statutory deadline. 293 The plaintiffs had met both conditions of panel
"review" and legislative "action" required for "aggrieved individual claimant"
status under the law.294 Thus, the State's waiver of sovereign immunity was not
extinguished, and the plaintiffs had a right to sue under chapter 674.295
Importantly, the court did not adopt a strict and narrow interpretation of the
waiver of sovereign immunity. Rather, it interpreted the waiver in light of the
chapter's overall remedial purpose. Indeed, the court appeared disturbed by the
State's contentions that beneficiaries would have no recourse to the courts after
fully participating in the administrative process. Thus, the court ensured that
the Hawaiian Home Lands beneficiaries would at least have their claims heard
after years of waiting not only on the DHHL waiting list, but also for a
resolution to their breach of trust claims.
The Moon Court also decided two cases addressing the applicability of state
law on Hawaiian Home Lands, generally finding that state health, safety, and
welfare laws apply if they do not significantly affect use of the land for
homesteading purposes. In State v. Jim, the court held that section 206 of the
HHCA, which provides that the Governor's power over state lands does not
extend to Hawaiian Home Lands, does not preclude the enforcement of state
and county criminal laws on those lands.296 The court interpreted section 206
to mean that the Governor cannot treat Hawaiian Home Lands like other state
lands because they "cannot serve purposes at odds with the trust purposes," but
this limitation "was never intended to limit the police power of the State." 2 97
The court acknowledged that the HHCA was designed to "rehabilitate the
indigenous Hawaiians by facilitating their access to farm and homestead
lands."298 In reading the limitation in section 206 with this purpose in mind,
the court concluded that "[t]he exercise of the State's inherent police power
does not necessarily conflict with the responsibility to manage and dispose of
these trust lands." 299 Although acknowledging that the "HHCA does not
293 Id. at 106, 137 P.3d at 1012.
294 Id. The court also addressed the State's alternative argument that Hawai'i Revised
Statutes section 674-17 was a "statute of repose" prohibiting the plaintiffs' claims filed in court
after the notice filing deadline of October 1, 1999. The court's determination, however, that the
plaintiffs had met the "Panel review and action by the legislature" prerequisites of Hawai'i
Revised Statutes section 674-17(b) negated the defendants' argument. Id. at 106-07, 137 P.3d
at 1012-13.
295 Id. at 107, 137 P.3d at 1013.
296 80 Haw. 168, 171-72, 907 P.2d 754, 757-58 (1995).
297 Id. at 171, 907 P.2d at 757.
298 Id. (quoting Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d
1216 (9th Cir. 1978)).
299 Id.
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expressly authorize the DHHL or any other entity to execute the laws on
Hawaiian [H]ome [L]ands,"oo the court concluded that the State has legislative
authority with respect to Hawaiian Home Lands, even though Congress retains
certain rights to alter, amend, or repeal the HHCA.3 01
In Kepo'o v. Watson, the Hawai'i Supreme Court considered whether
Hawai'i's environmental impact statement (EIS) law302 requirements apply to
Hawaiian Home Lands.30 3 In answering this question, the court determined
that: Hawaiian Home Lands constitute "state lands"; the HHCA, although
originally enacted by Congress, is a part of the Hawai'i Constitution so that
federal preemption was not an issue; and, most importantly, Hawai'i's
environmental protection law does not conflict with the HHCA.30 Addressing
the argument that the EIS law conflicts with the HHCA, the court stated that
"police power regulations apply to Hawaiian [H]ome [L]ands, and executive
officials may enforce them, as long as these regulations do not significantly
affect the land." 305 The court reasoned that as an environmental law, the EIS
requirement was also a police power regulation not significantly affecting the
land, but instead involved "procedural and informational requirements" with
only incidental effects on the land.o6 The court distinguished the incidental
effects of the EIS statute from other laws, such as executive orders removing
lands from the trust or county zoning ordinances that restrict DHHL in the use
of trust land.307 Accordingly, the EIS statute does not "affirmatively require
DHHL to use the land for any particular purposes." 308 The court believed that
the EIS law merely imposed a procedural requirement that ultimately served the
309best interest of trust beneficiaries.
The Moon Court's decisions on the Hawaiian Home Lands trust have
demonstrated a true regard for the rights of beneficiaries. The court in Aged
300 Id.
301 Id. at 172, 907 P.2d at 758.
302 HAW. REv. STAT. ch. 343 (1993).
303 87 Haw. 91, 95, 952 P.2d 379, 383 (1998).
3 Id. at 98, 952 P.2d at 386.
30s Id. at 99, 952 P.2d at 387 (citing State v. Jim, 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995)). The
court also discussed Attorney General Opinion No. 95-05, which had concluded that state and
federal endangered species laws imposing civil and criminal penalties apply to Hawaiian Home
Lands. Id. In footnote 9, the court noted that the "Attorney General's opinions are highly
instructive but are not binding upon this court. Thus, although we find the particular opinions
cited in this decision to be persuasive in relation to the present case, we are not required to
follow them." Id. at 99 n.9, 952 P.2d at 387 n.9 (emphasis in original).
306 id
307 Id. at 101-02, 952 P.2d at 389-90.
308 Id. at 101, 952 P.2d at 389.
3 Id. at 100, 952 P.2d at 388.
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Hawaiians310 and Bush v. Watson 3 recognized that beneficiaries on the waiting
list have a "property interest" protectable under due process, held the State to
the specific terms of the HHCA, and insured that beneficiary voices were
heard. Similarly, in State v. Jim3 12 and Kepo 'o v. Watson,3 13 the court struck a
balance that showed a concern for beneficiaries but was also entirely consistent
with the federal delegation to the State of responsibility for implementing the
HHCA. In Kalima,3 14 a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Moon,
the court gave full meaning to the terms of a law that was originally meant to
resolve long-standing trust breaches. 315 Instead of reading the act narrowly to
preclude claims and protect the State from potentially high damages claims, the
court recognized the remedial purpose of the law and the fact that the claimant
beneficiaries had done everything possible to perfect their claims. In relation to
the Hawaiian Home Lands trust, the Moon Court has continued on the path of
justice, Ke Ala Pono, first charted by Chief Justice William S. Richardson,
holding the State to the highest standards in dealing with trust beneficiaries.
V. THE PUBLIC LAND TRUST3 1 6
Prior to 1978, the State had interpreted section 5(f) of the Admission Act 3 1 7
to require only that the proceeds and income from trust lands be used for the
fulfillment of any one of the five trust purposes; trust proceeds were primarily
directed toward public education.318 At the 1978 Constitutional Convention,
however, the Hawaiian Affairs Committee sought to clarify and implement the
Admission Act's trust language as it relates to Native Hawaiians.19 As a result,
three new sections were added to the constitution, fundamentally altering the
State's role in implementing section 5(f)'s trust language.
Article XII, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution specified that the lands
granted to the State by section 5(b) of the Admission Act, with the exception of
310 Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995).
31 81 Haw. 474, 918 P.2d 1130 (1996).
312 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995).
87 Haw. 91, 952 P.2d 379 (1998).
314 Kalima v. State, 111 Haw. 84, 137 P.3d 990 (2006).
31s Id. at 98-101, 137 P.3d at 1004-07.
316 Some text in this section has previously appeared in other publications, including
MacKenzie, The Lum Court, supra note 4, and Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, The Ceded
Lands Trust, in HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 26.
317 Admission Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5, 73 Stat. 4, 5-6.
318 LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, FINAL REPORT ON THE PUBuc LAND TRUST, AUDIT REPORTNO. 86-
17, at 14 (Dec. 1986).
319 See generally HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS COMM. REP. No. 59 and COMM. OF THE WHOLE REPORT
No. 13, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 643,
1017 (1980).
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Hawaiian Home Lands, were to be held by the State as a public trust for two
beneficiaries: Native HawaiianS320 and the general public.3 2 1 Another section
established the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), to be governed by a
nine-member board of trustees and to hold assets in trust for Native Hawaiians
and Hawaiians. 322 A final section ensured that OHA's trust assets would
include a pro rata portion of the income and proceeds from lands identified in
article XII, section 4.323
A. Public Land Trust Revenues
Native Hawaiians have not been successful, either legislatively or through
the courts, in gaining a consistent and unambiguous answer to what constitutes
a pro rata share of the public land trust revenues. Although the 1978
constitutional amendments provide that OHA should receive a pro rata share of
the income and proceeds from the trust, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has thus
far declined to judicially protect that right, instead relying on the legislative
320 The Constitutional Convention structured the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) as the
entity to receive and administer a share of the public land trust funds designated in section 5(f)
for the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians, as defined in the HHCA. See id. The
HHCA defines Native Hawaiians as those of not less than half aboriginal Hawaiian ancestry.
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, § 201(a), 42 Stat. 108, 108 (1921).
The OHA amendment names two beneficiaries ofthe OHA trust-Native Hawaiians (those with
fifty percent or more Hawaiian ancestry) and Hawaiians (those with any quantum of Hawaiian
ancestry). HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 5; HAW. REv. STAT. § 10-2 (2009). OHA's public land trust
funds have largely been utilized to benefit the Native Hawaiian community as a whole. See Day
v. Apoliona, 616 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that federal law does not
require the OHA trustees to use section 5(f) trust funds solely for the benefit of Native
Hawaiians of fifty percent or more Hawaiian ancestry; those funds can be utilized for any of the
five trust purposes). Moreover, the Day v. Apoliona court held that the OHA trustees have
broad discretion to decide how to serve those purposes. Id. at 926-27.
321 HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 4 provides:
PUBLIC TRUST. The lands granted to the State of Hawaii by Section 5(b) of the Admission
Act and pursuant to Article XVI, Section 7, of the State Constitution, excluding therefrom
lands defined as "available lands" by Section 203 of the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act, 1920, as amended, shall be held by the State as a public trust for native Hawaiians
and the general public.
322 Id. art. XII, § 5.
323 Id. art. XII, § 6 provides, in part:
The board of trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall exercise power as provided
by law: to manage and administer the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of the
lands, natural resources, minerals and income derived from whatever sources for native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians, including all income andproceeds from that pro rata portion
of the trust referred to in section 4 of this article for native Hawailans ....
(Emphasis added).
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process to resolve these difficult questions.324 This may be an indication of the
Moon Court's concern for the potential impact on the state treasury as well as
its willingness to defer to the legislative branch. Even in these decisions,
however, the Moon Court consistently emphasized that the State's obligation to
Native Hawaiians is firmly rooted in the Hawai'i Constitution.
Soon after OHA's creation in 1978, the 1980 State Legislature set OHA's
share of the public land trust proceeds and income at twenty percent.325 Even
after that enactment, however, disputes over the classification of specific
parcels of land as ceded or non-ceded, questions as to whether section 5(f)
contemplates gross or net income, and problems in defining "proceeds"
plagued the State and hampered OHA's efforts to provide benefits to the Native
Hawaiian community.32 6 In 1983 and 1984, the OHA trustees filed two suits,
seeking clarification of the law setting OHA's pro rata share at twenty
percent.2 In 1987, the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Trustees of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki dismissed OHA's claims based on the political
question doctrine, finding the issues "'to be of a peculiarly political nature and
therefore not meet for judicial determination."' 3 2 8
In 1990, OHA and the State reached a settlement of the trust revenue
dispute, eventually embodied in Act 304,329 defining both the trust res and trust
revenues. Act 304 segregated revenue from trust lands into two categories-
sovereign and proprietary revenue.33 3 Act 304 defined sovereign revenue,
which was not subject to the OHA trust provision, as the revenue generated as
an exercise of governmental or sovereign power.3 3 1 The sovereign revenue
category included personal and corporate income taxes, general excise taxes,
fines collected for violations of state law, and federal grants or subsidies.332
Proprietary revenue, which was subject to the OHA trust provision, was
324 See infra discussion of Office ofHawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 1), 96 Haw. 388, 31
P.3d 901 (2001), Office ofHawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 11), 110 Haw. 338, 133 P.3d 767
(2006), and Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hawaii State Legislature, No. 30535, 2010 Haw.
LEXIS 184 (Aug. 18, 2010).
325 Act of June 16, 1980, No. 273, 1980 Haw. Sess. Laws 525 (codified as amended at HAW.
REV. STAT. § 10-13.5 (2009)).
326 See LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, supra note 318, at 109 (indicating that if one category of
disputed lands had been included in the trust, revenues to OHA would have increased by $1.7
million a year).
327 Trs. of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 165-166, 737 P.2d 446,
453 (1987). The court consolidated the two cases for hearing and disposition. Id. at 167, 737
P.2d at 454.
32. Id. at 175, 737 P.2d at 458 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946)).
329 Act of July 3, 1990, No. 304, 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws 947.
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defined as the income generated from the use or disposition of the public trust
lands.333 Included in this category were rents, leases, and licenses for the use of
trust lands, minerals, and runway landing fees.334 In addition, Act 304 defined
revenue as those generated by activities from "the actual use" of trust lands.
Although Act 304 appeared to settle many of the OHA entitlement issues,
not all issues had been resolved.136  OHA returned to state court in 1994
seeking an accounting and restitution of a pro rata portion of disputed public
land trust revenues.33 7 The disputed revenues included lease payments from
Honolulu International Airport's duty-free concession agreements, including
payments based on receipts from the Waik-kl duty-free store (DFS), and other
proceeds and rents.338 On a motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit
court found in favor of OHA and denied the State's motion to dismiss the
action. 33 9 The State appealed.
While the case was on appeal to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, Congress
passed the 1998 "Forgiveness Act," waiving repayment of past diversions from
airport revenues made for the betterment of Native Hawaiians and forbidding
any further payments. 34 0 The Forgiveness Act specifically stated that nothing in
its terms should be construed to affect trust obligations or state statutes defining
the obligations to Native Hawaiians.
In the 2001 case, Office ofHawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 1), the Hawai'i
Supreme Court first determined that Act 304 required that airport revenues,
including concessionaire rent and fees, be paid to OHA.342 The court examined
the plain language of Act 304's definition of revenue as including rents derived
from any lease resulting from the actual use of trust lands.343 The court
333 id
334 Id. § 3, 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws at 949.
335 Id.
336 Paragraph 7 of the agreement between OHA and the Office of State Planning (OSP),
which represented the State in the negotiations, acknowledges that the settled amount "does not
include several matters regarding revenue which OHA has asserted is due to OHA and which
OSP has not accepted or agreed to." Memorandum of Understanding at 9 (April 28, 1993) (on
file with author).
3 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 1), 96 Haw. 388, 392, 31 P.3d 901, 905 (2001).
338 OHA sought its pro rata share of revenues from "(1) Waikiki Duty Free receipts (in
connection with the lease of ceded lands at the Honolulu International Airport); (2) Hilo
Hospital patient services receipts; (3) receipts from the Hawai'i Housing Authority and the
Housing Finance and Development Corporation for projects situated on ceded lands; and (4)
interest earned on withheld revenues." Id.
1 Id. at 388, 31 P.3d at 901.
340 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
105-66, § 340(b)-(c), 111 Stat. 1425, 1448 (1998).
3 Id. § 340(d), 111 Stat. at 1449.
342 OHA 1, 96 Haw. at 395, 31 P.3d at 908.
343 id.
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carefully analyzed the agreement between DFS and the State, concluding that
the rent paid was for the "actual use" of the airport premises.
Having found in OHA's favor on the major underlying claim, the court then
considered whether there was a conflict between the Forgiveness Act's
prohibition against payment from airport revenues and Act 304's requirement
that airport revenues be paid to OHA.345 OHA argued that the savings clause in
the Forgiveness Act required the State to pay the airport revenue from another
fund.346 The savings clause stated, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
affect any . .. statute . . . that define[s] the obligations of [the State] to ...
Native Hawaiians ... in connection with ceded lands, except to make clear that
airport revenues may not be used to satisfy such obligations."34 7 The court
rejected OHA's argument, concluding that "the savings clause provides that
state statutes shall not be interfered with, except where those statutes provide
for payment of airport revenues to satisfy the State's obligations. Because Act
304 obligates the State to pay airport revenues to OHA in this case, the savings
clause cannot 'save' Act 304."348
OHA also pointed to state law providing OHA trustees with the power to
"manage, invest, and administer . . all income" received by the office
equivalent to that pro rata portion34 9 derived from the ceded lands and another
provision that contained similar language 350 to argue that the State had the
ability to pay OHA "equivalent" amounts.35 t The court made short shrift of this
argument, concluding that an express and clear statement by the Legislature
was required-a statement not found in Act 304 or its legislative history-to
"appropriate" funds from other sources to OHA.3 s2
Act 304 contained a non-severability clause, stating that any provision held
to be in conflict with federal law would invalidate the entire act. The non-
severability clause also provided that if Act 304 was invalidated, the
immediately preceding version of state law on OHA's entitlement would be
reinstated.354 The court held that Act 304 was invalid, and the prior state law, a
law already found to have no judicially discoverable and manageable standards
34 Id.
345 Id. at 397, 31 P.3d at 910.
346 id
347 Id. (citing Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-66, § 340, 111 Stat. 1425, 1448 (1998)).
348 id.
349 HAw. REv. STAT. § 10-5(1) (1993).
350 Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 10-13(b), as amended by Act 304, also used similar
"equivalent to" language and was cited in OHA I, 96 Haw. at 394, 31 P.3d at 907.
3s' OHA 1, 96 Haw. at 398, 31 P.3d at 911.
352 Id. at 398-99, 31 P.3d at 911-12.
3 Act of July 3, 1990, No. 304, § 16, 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws 947, 953.
354 Id.
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in the 1987 Yamasaki case, was automatically reinstated.3 5 ' The court then
determined that the case presented a non-justiciable political question. 356
Although it invalidated Act 304, the court acknowledged that the State's
obligation to Native Hawaiians is firmly established in the state constitution,
stating that "it is incumbent upon the legislature to enact legislation that gives
effect to the rights of native Hawaiians to benefit from the ceded lands trust."3"
In 2003, OHA again brought suit, contending that Act 304 constituted a
contract between the State and OHA that the State had breached. 3 58 OHA also
argued that the State breached its fiduciary duties by not challenging the
Federal Aviation Administration memorandum leading to the passage of the
Forgiveness Act and invalidation of Act 304, and by failing to inform OHA of
these relevant facts. 35 9 In Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 11), the
Hawai'i Supreme Court held that there was no language in Act 304 evidencing
a legislative intent to create a contract.360
In reviewing OHA's claim that the State had breached its trust duty to deal
impartially with beneficiaries and to inform them of its decisions regarding
actions in response to the federal government's position on airport revenues,
the court found that under the proper circumstances, OHA could have brought
the breach of trust claims36' under Hawai'i Revised Statutes chapter 673, which
waives the State's sovereign immunity for such claims.362 The court
3ss OHA 1, 96 Haw. at 399, 31 P.3d at 912.
356 Id. at 401, 31 P.3d at 914.
357 Id. Immediately after the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision, the State stopped all trust
land revenue payments to OHA. See Debra Barayuga, OHA Sues to Resume Land Revenues,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, July 22, 2003, available at
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2003/07/22/news/story5.html. Soon after Governor Linda
Lingle took office in 2003, she issued an executive order restoring trust land revenue payments
to OHA. Executive Order 03-03 (February 11, 2003) (on file with author). The 2003 Hawai'i
State Legislature appropriated funds for back payments to OHA for the revenue that was
discontinued after the OHA I decision. Act of April 23, 2003, No. 34, 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws
46.
358 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA II), 110 Haw. 338, 346-47, 133 P.3d 767, 775-
76 (2006).
"9 Id at 355, 133 P.3d at 784.
360 Id. at 354, 133 P.3d at 783.
361 Id. at 356, 133 P.3d at 785.
362 HAw. REv. STAT. § 673-1 (1993) provides:
(a) The State waives its immunity for any breach of trust or fiduciary duty resulting from
the acts or omissions from its agents, officers or employees in the management and
disposition of trust funds and resources of:
(2) the native Hawaiian public trust under Article XII, sections 4, 5, and 6 of the
Constitution of the State of Hawaii implementing section 5(f) of the Admission Act;
And shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for punitive damages.
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determined, however, that OHA failed to follow the notice requirements of the
law.363 The court also rejected OHA's argument that the two-year statute of
limitations did not apply.3 " The court found that OHA did not fall within the
law's exception for state entities since, under Hawai'i law, OHA is entitled to
sue, and did in fact sue in OHA's corporate capacity, not as a state entity.?
Although finding OHA's breach of trust claims barred, the court reiterated its
earlier call in OHA I for the Legislature to implement the trust provisions of the
Hawai'i Constitution. Indeed, the court quoted from U.S. Senator Daniel
Inouye's speech during Senate floor debates on the Federal Forgiveness Act:
The airports continue to sit on ceded lands, the State's obligation to compensate
OHA for the use of the land upon which the airports sit should also continue ....
In light of the unique history of Hawaii's ceded lands and the obligations that
flow from these lands for the betterment ofthe Native Hawaiian people, I believe
that this is more than a fiscal matter, this is a fiduciary matter-one of trust and
obligation ....
In June 2010, in an original action in the Hawai'i Supreme Court, OHA
asked the Hawai'i Supreme Court to require the 2011 Legislature to clarify the
amount of past due "ceded lands" funding that should be transferred to OHA.3 67
Two months later, the Hawai'i Supreme Court denied the request,3 68 stating
that OHA had failed to demonstrate that it had "a clear and indisputable right"
to relief.369 To have that right to relief, OHA would have had to establish that
the Legislature's action on the issue would be "ministerial" in nature; in other
words, the law prescribing the Legislature's duty would have had to set forth
the duty "with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of
discretion or judgment."370
The State contended that Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 673-9, which provides that chapter
673 "shall not apply to suits in equity or law brought by or on behalf of [OHA] in which the
matters in controversy involve the proportionate share of ceded land or special fund revenues
allocated to [OHA] by the legislature," barred OHA's suit. OHA II, I10 Haw. at 358, 133 P.3d
at 787. The Moon Court held, however, that the action did not involve the proportionate share
of OHA's revenues, since that amount had been set by the Legislature. Id. The court
determined that the "damages resulting [are] from the State's breach of trust duties and do not
require a determination of OHA's proportionate share of revenues." Id.
363 OHA II, 110 Haw. at 358-59, 133 P.3d at 787-88.
364 id.
36s Id. at 359-60, 133 P.3d at 788-89.
366 Id. at 366, 133 P.3d at 795.
367 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Haw. State Legislature, No.
30535 (June 2, 2010) (on file with author).
368 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Haw. State Legislature, No. 30535, 2010 Haw. LEXIS 184,
at *1 (Aug. 18, 2010).
369 Id.
370 Id. at *2.
488
2011 / KE ALA PONO
In 2006, the Legislature set the interim revenue to be transferred to OHA
from the public land trust as $15.1 million annually beginning with the 2005-06
fiscal year and authorizing a one-time payment of $17.5 million for prior
underpayments. OHA continues to receive only $15.1 million per year in
lieu of the twenty percent pro rata share established by earlier law.372
Nevertheless, in a positive development and after several failed attempts, in
2012 all claims for back revenue, from the date of OHA's establishment in
1978 through June 30, 2012, were settled through the State's conveyance of 10
parcels of mostly waterfront property in Kaka'ako, Honolulu, to OHA.3 Thus,
in the area of trust revenues, the Moon Court's unambiguous recognition of the
State's constitutional responsibilities combined with its deferral to the
legislative branch have begun to yield substantial benefit to OHA and its
beneficiaries.
B. Moratorium on the Alienation of the Public Land Trust3 74
The contours of the State's fiduciary responsibility in relation to the public
land trust or "ceded" lands have not been well defined by the state or federal
courts. The Hawai'i Supreme Court, however, was given the opportunity to
more clearly delineate the trust duties in a 2008 case, Office of Hawaiian
Affairs v. Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i
(HCDCH 1).31 In this landmark decision addressing Hawai'i's contested
relationship with the United States, the significance of 'dina to the Native
Hawaiian people, and the meaning of apology and reconciliation, the Moon
Court placed a moratorium on the sale or transfer of trust lands until the Native
Hawaiian community's unrelinquished claims to those lands could be resolved.
The case began in 1994, when the Housing Finance and Development
Corporation (HFDC),376 a state-created corporation established to ensure low-
3n Act of June 7, 2006, No. 178, 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws 702. Act 178 also contained a
disclaimer clause stating, "[n]othing in this Act shall resolve or settle, or be deemed to
acknowledge the existence of, the claims of native Hawaiians to the income and proceeds" of a
pro rata portion of the public land trust. Id. § 7.
372 Id. § 2.
373 The settlement is embodied in Act of April 11, 2012, No. 15, 2012 Haw. Sess. Laws 24.
374 An earlier version of some of the material in this section can be found in an article written
by 2008 William S. Richardson School of Law graduate Moanikeala Crowell Colon entitled
Ho'oholo Imua-Towards Reconciliation? in KA HE'E (Summer 2008) and is used with
permission. The article is available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/~nhlawctr/article5-4.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2011).
37 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (HCDCHI), 117 Haw.
174, 177 P.3d 884 (2008).
376 Id. at 187, 177 P.3d at 897 (noting that the original agency involved in the action was the
Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HFDC)). In 1997, the Legislature
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income housing development, was in the process of transferring two parcels of
trust lands-one at La'i 'Opua on Hawai'i island and another at Leiali'i on
Maui-to private developers for residential housing.37 Transfers of trust lands
had occurred before, but this was the first proposed transfer after Congress'
passage of the 1993 Apology Resolution37 ' and similar state legislation
recognizing the Hawaiian community's potential claims to the trust lands.3 79
In the Apology Resolution, Congress apologized to the Native Hawaiian
people for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i with the participation of
agents and citizens of the United States and expressed its "commitment to
acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow ... in order to provide a proper
foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people."380 Congress specifically recognized that the Government,
Crown, and public lands of Hawai'i were taken without the consent of or
compensation to the Native Hawaiian people or their sovereign government and
that "the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims. .
over their national lands to the United States."38'
Based on the state legislation and the Apology Resolution, in 1994 OHA and
four individual plaintiffs sued the HFDC board members and state officials to
stop the transfer of the lands.382 In HCDCHI, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the State from alienating the two parcels or any lands from the trust.383
Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that transferring or selling trust
lands would not limit future claims by Native Hawaiians to the lands.384
consolidated HFDC and the Hawai'i Housing Authority into the Housing and Community
Development Corporation of Hawai'i (HCDCH); in 2006, the Legislature divided HCDCH into
two separate agencies. HCDCHI, 117 Haw. at 187-88 n.9, 177 P.3d at 897-98 n.9. Since this
action commenced before these legislative changes, the court used the designation HFDC
throughout its opinion and this article will follow the same convention. See id.
. Id. at 187-88, 177 P.3d at 897-98 (discussing the history of the parcels). The La'i 'Opua
parcel was subsequently transferred to the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands. Id. at 181 n.4,
177 P.3d at 891 n.4. See also Andrew Gomes, Liliuokalani Trust Objects to Big Isle Housing
Project, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, Nov. 5, 2010, available at
http://www.staradvertiser.com/business/businessnews/20101105_Liliuokalanitrust_objects
to BigIsle housingproject.html.
378 Apology Resolution, supra note 1, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 429-30.
380 Apology Resolution, supra note 1, § 1(4), 107 Stat. at 1513.
38 Id. "whereas" cl. 29, 107 Stat. at 1512.
382 The OHA plaintiffs filed a complaint in the First Circuit Court on November 4, 1994, and
the individual plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Second Circuit Court on November 9, 1994.
HCDCHI, 117 Haw. at 188 n.12, 177 P.3d at 898 n.12. When the First Amended Complaint
was filed in August 1995, the individual plaintiffs and their claims were added to those of the
OHA plaintiffs in the First Circuit action. Id.
383 Id. at 188, 177 P.3d at 898.
384 Id. at 181, 177 P.3d at 891.
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In 2002, the trial court issued a lengthy opinion determining that the
plaintiffs' claims were barred by a number ofjurisdictional and other defenses,
including sovereign immunity, waiver and estoppel, and justiciability
considerations-specifically, political question, ripeness, and the mandate
against advisory opinions.38 5 The trial court also concluded that the State had
the express authority to alienate trust lands.386
OHA argued, among other things, that the State could not alienate trust lands
because of its trust responsibilities to the Native Hawaiian people and its duty
to address and resolve their pending claims.387 In his 2008 unanimous decision,
Chief Justice Ronald T.Y. Moon gave substance to the State's commitment to
reconciliation with the Native Hawaiian community by prohibiting the State
from alienating trust lands until the claims of the Native Hawaiian people to
those lands had been resolved. 8
As in other cases involving Native Hawaiian claims, the Hawai'i Supreme
Court first addressed a number of procedural and jurisdictional issues. The
court first reviewed the State's contention that, based on a memorandum
opinion issued in a 1998 case, Ewa Marina,389 the plaintiffs were collaterally
estopped from re-litigating the issue of the State's power to alienate ceded lands
from the trust. In Ewa Marina, a case in which OHA was a party, the court
indicated that the State had the authority to sell ceded lands if such a sale
promoted a valid public purpose and the revenues generated were used for the
trust purposes set forth in section 5(f) of the Admission Act.3 90 The parties in
Ewa Marina, however, had not raised or briefed the issue of the sale of ceded
lands because the case dealt with the grant of a Conservation District Use Area
(CDUA) permit.3 9' The Hawai'i Supreme Court noted that the issue in the Ewa
Marina case was not identical to the issue raised in HCDCH L 392 Moreover,
whether an injunction should be issued was not essential to the final judgment
in Ewa Marina because there, the court only needed to determine whether the
State had violated its fiduciary duties by issuing the CDUA. 3
The court then addressed the contention that the plaintiffs' claims relating to
the Leiali'i parcel were barred by sovereign immunity because title to the parcel
had already been transferred to HFDC and, under applicable law, was no longer
385 Id. at 189, 177 P.3d at 899.
386 Id.
387 Id. at 188, 177 P.3d at 898.
388 Id.
389 Trs. of Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res. (Ewa Marina), No.
19774, 87 Haw. 471, 959 P.2d 841 (Mar. 12, 1998).
390 HCDCHI, 117 Haw. at 196, 177 P.3d at 906.
392 Id.
3 Id. at 197, 177 P.3d at 907.
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public land.394 Thus, the State argued, it would have to expend funds to return
the parcel to the trust; moreover, HFDC had already spent $31 million
improving the parcel. 39s Citing the Pele Defense Fund v. Paty case, the court
stated that it had adopted a rule that makes an important distinction between
prospective and retrospective relief:
Ifthe reliefsought against a state official is prospective in nature, then the relief
may be allowed regardless of the state's sovereign immunity. This is true even
though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.
However, relief that is tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of
law, even though styled as something else, is barred by sovereign immunity.
The court reviewed cases where it determined that sovereign immunity
barred a particular claim as well as those in which sovereign immunity was not
a bar because the effect on the state treasury, if any, would be "ancillary." 3 97
Applying those cases to the plaintiffs' claims related to the Leiali'i parcel, the
court recognized that the $31 million HFDC had spent developing
infrastructure on the property was significant.39 8 Nevertheless, the court
believed that sovereign immunity was not a bar to the plaintiffs' claims because
the benefit of those improvements would inure to the State and the plaintiffs
were not asking that the $31 million be returned to them, or even to the State.399
Thus, the court characterized the effect on the state treasury as substantial but
"ancillary."A00
The court next turned to the doctrines of waiver and estoppel in relation to
the Leiali'i parcel. The circuit court had determined that OHA and the
individual plaintiffs had waived their right to contest the land sale because of
their actions and inactions between 1987, when HFDC first proposed use of the
Leiali'i parcel for low-income housing development, and 1994, when the
plaintiffs filed suit. 40' The Hawai'i Supreme Court determined, however, that
the plaintiffs, although aware of the potential sale of the parcel since at least
1989, did not have knowledge of the United States' admissions and the full
extent of the Native Hawaiian claim to the ceded lands until the adoption of the
Apology Resolution and related state legislation in 1993.402 Since a waiver
394 id.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 198, 177 P.3d at 908 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578,608-10,837 P.2d
1247, 1266 (1995) (emphasis in original) (citations, ellipses, footnotes, and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
3 Id. at 198-99, 177 P.3d at 908-09.




402 Id. at 202, 177 P.3d at 912.
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requires a knowing or intentional relinquishment of a right or claim, the court
determined that the plaintiffs had not waived their right to seek an injunction on
the sale of the Leiali'i parcel. 403 Similarly, in addressing whether the plaintiffs
were estopped from seeking an injunction because they had failed to object to
the sale earlier and, in OHA's case, had undertaken negotiations for OHA's pro
rata share of revenue from the sale, the court found it significant that "equitable
estoppel requires proof that one person willfully caused another person to
erroneously believe a certain state of things, and that person reasonably relied
on this erroneous belief to his or her detriment." Here, the court concluded,
it was not until the Apology Resolution was signed into law that the plaintiffs'
claims "regarding the State's explicit fiduciary duty to preserve the corpus" of
the trust arose and thus, it was not until that time that the plaintiffs' claims
could have been actionable.40 5
The court then disposed of several important jurisdictional issues related to
the ceded lands in general, as opposed to the Leiali'i parcel in particular. The
circuit court had determined that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs'
injunction request because the State had not consented to be sued "in a lawsuit
contesting the validity of its title to the ceded lands." 406 In addition, the circuit
court had examined the effect of the plaintiffs' claim for relief, characterizing it
as "depriving the State of control over public lands . . . [which] is the
'functional equivalent of a quiet title action,' . . . barred by sovereign
immunity."407 The Hawai'i Supreme Court, however, saw a distinction
between an action asking the court to transfer the lands to the plaintiffs'
possession, which is clearly analogous to a quiet title action, and this case, in
which the plaintiffs sought an injunction barring the "future alienation" of trust
lands until their unrelinquished claims could be resolved. 4 0 8 As such, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were prospective in nature and not barred
by sovereign immunity.409
The court then turned to the State's contention that the claim was not "ripe."
The court examined the two prongs of the ripeness doctrine, which it
characterized as "peculiarly" a matter of timing:410 (1) whether the issue is fit
for judicial resolution because the issue is primarily legal, needs no further
403 Id.
404 Id. at 203, 177 P.3d at 913 (quoting Potter v. Haw. Newspaper Agency, 89 Haw. 411,
419, 974 P.2d 51, 59 (1999)).
405 Id.
406 Id. at 204, 177 P.3d at 914.
407 Id.
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factual development, and involves a final agency action; and (2) the potential
hardship to the plaintiffs if the court does not act.4 11
The court concluded that the plaintiffs' request for an injunction was ripe for
adjudication.412 In addressing the first prong, the court noted that the plaintiffs
were not seeking a determination as to whether Native Hawaiians are entitled to
ownership of the lands, but merely "a determination [on] whether an injunction
is appropriate to allow for a resolution of their claims without further
diminishment of the trust res.' " In the court's view, there was "no doubt that
the issuance of an injunction involves a legal question."414 Moreover, the court
indicated, the record demonstrated that there was no need for further factual
development.4 15 With regard to the Leiali'i parcel, the parcel had been
transferred to HFDC so a final agency action had been taken.4 16 "[A]lthough
'final agency action' with regard to the ceded lands in general ha[d] yet to be
taken," the court found that the very nature of the plaintiffs' requested relief
dictated that a judicial decision regarding an injunction was appropriate.417
Regarding the second prong, the potential hardship to the plaintiffs, the court
emphasized that "[o]nce the ceded lands are alienated from the public lands
trust, they [would] be lost forever" and would not be "available to satisfy the
unrelinquished claims of [N]ative Hawaiians."418 The court concluded that "the
loss of the land itself entails a much greater injury 'than possible financial
loss."A19
In rejecting the State's contention that the case presented a non-justiciable
political question, the court distinguished the underlying claim for return of the
ceded lands with the plaintiffs' request for an injunction to preserve the lands
until a political resolution could be reached.4 20 The court stressed that the
plaintiffs did not seek ajudicial resolution of the underlying claim for the lands,
but instead asked for protection of trust assets while the political branches
resolved the dispute. 42 1 The court concluded that "[t]his modest goal is well
within the domain of the judiciary[.]"A2 2
On the merits, the court's decision was grounded in its interpretation of the
1993 Apology Resolution, as well as Hawai'i laws recognizing the claims of
411 Id. at 207, 177 P.3d at 917.
412 Id. at 209, 177 P.3d at 919.









422 Id. at 210, 177 P.3d at 920.
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the Native Hawaiian people to the lands. The court rejected the State's position
that the Apology Resolution was a mere policy statement, declaring that the
Apology Resolution had the force of law because it resulted from legislative
423deliberations. The court concluded that while the Apology Resolution did
not require that trust lands be transferred to the Native Hawaiian people, it did
recognize their unrelinquished claims to the lands.424
Moreover, the court reasoned, the Apology Resolution and analogous state
legislation implicated the State's fiduciary duty to preserve the trust lands until
the claims of the Native Hawaiian community are resolved.42 5 Relying on its
earlier explication of the State's trust duties in Ahuna v. Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands426 and Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,42 the court stated
that "[s]uch duty is consistent with the State's 'obligation to use reasonable
skill and care' in managing the public lands trust" and that "the State's conduct
'should .. . be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards." 42 8
Although the court relied on the Apology Resolution for its factual
determinations, the court separately grounded its decision in Hawai'i law. The
court specifically pointed to Acts 354 and 359, both passed in 1993, in which
the State Legislature recognized that "the indigenous people of Hawai'i were
denied ... their lands" and made other findings similar to those of the Apology
Resolution.4 29 The court also found support for its decision in a 1997 law, Act
329, designed to clarify the proper management of lands in the public land
trust, and another 1993 law, Act 340, requiring that the island of Kaho'olawe
be held in trust and transferred to a sovereign Native Hawaiian entity in the
future.430
The court summed up:
In this case, Congress, the Hawai'i state legislature, the parties, and the trial court
all recognize (1) the cultural importance of the land to native Hawaiians, (2) that
the ceded lands were illegally taken from the native Hawaiian monarchy, (3) that
future reconciliation between the state and the native Hawaiian people is
contemplated, and (4) once any ceded lands are alienated from the public land
trust, they will be gone forever.431
423 Id. at 191, 177 P.3d at 901.
424 Id. at 192, 177 P.3d at 902.
425 Id. at 210, 177 P.3d at 920.
426 64 Haw. 327, 640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
427 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992).
428 HCDCHI, 117 Haw. at 195, 177 P.3d at 905 (quotingAhuna, 64 Haw. at 339, 640 P.2d
at 1169).
429 Id. at 193-94, 177 P.3d at 903-04 (quoting Act of July 1, 1993, No. 359, § 1(9), 1993
Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, 1010).
430 Id. at 194, 177 P.3d at 904.
431 Id. at 213, 177 P.3d at 923.
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The court then turned to whether a permanent injunction should be issued,
stating, "without an injunction, any ceded lands alienated from the public lands
trust will be lost and will not be available for the future reconciliation
efforts." 32 Significantly, the court recognized that money reparations in lieu of
the lands themselves would not be an adequate remedy because of the
inextricable bond between the Native Hawaiian people and the land or'dina.
Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiffs had met all the requirements for
an injunction "pending final resolution of native Hawaiian claims through the
political process."434 The court sent the case back to the trial court with
instructions to issue an order granting an injunction prohibiting the defendants
from selling or otherwise transferring the specific lands involved and any other
lands from the public land trust until the claims ofNative Hawaiians to the trust
lands have been resolved.435
The State sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the
Hawai'i court's decision cast a cloud on the State's title to the trust lands and
contravened both the 1898 Joint Resolution of Annexation and the 1959
Admission Act.4 36 In Hawaii v. Office ofHawaiian Affairs, the United States
Supreme Court, in a unanimous 2009 opinion, reversed and remanded. 37 The
Court first determined that a federal question existed, pointing out that the
432 Id. at 214, 177 P.3d at 924.
433 Id. The court stated, "Although an argument could be made that monetary reparations
would be the logical remedy for such loss, we are keenly aware-as was Congress-that 'the
health and well-being of the native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings
and attachment to the land."' Id. (citation omitted and emphasis removed).
434 Id. at 218, 177 P.3d at 928.
435 Id.
436 Initially, the State's petition for certiorari contended that the Apology Resolution was
merely an expression of policy and that by construing the federal government's apology "to
impair Hawaii's sovereign prerogatives, the Hawaii Supreme Court badly misconstrued
congressional intent and raised grave federalism concerns." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3,
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (No. 07-1372), 2008 WL
1934869 at *3. Subsequently, in briefing on the merits, the State argued, among other things:
The [Hawai'i Supreme C]ourt enjoined any sales of the ceded lands on the theory that
title might actually belong not to the State, but to "the Native Hawaiian people." But that
legal theory runs headlong into the Newlands Resolution, which vests absolute and
unreviewable title in the United States; the Organic Act of 1900, which confirms the
extinguishment of any Native Hawaiian or other claims to the ceded lands; and the
Admission Act of 1959, which transfers to the State the same absolute title previously
held by the United States. This body of federal law forecloses any competing claims to
the ceded lands, such as those respondents present here. It similarly bars any judicial
remedy that, like this injunction, is premised on the possible validity of such competing
claims.
Brief for Petitioner at 19, Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (No. 07-
1372), 2008 WL 5150171 at *19.
437 129 S. Ct. 1436, 1445 (2009).
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Hawai'i court's opinion was replete with language that linked its reasoning and
judgment to the Apology Resolution, thus making it impossible to deny "that
the decision below rested on federal law." 4 38
Next, the Court turned to the Apology Resolution's two substantive
provisions and examined their effect on Hawai'i's command over public trust
land transfers. In the first provision, contained in section one, Congress
"acknowledges the historical significance" of the overthrow's centennial,
"recognizes and commends" reconciliatory efforts, "apologizes to Native
Hawaiians" for their loss of independence, "expresses its commitment to
acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow," and "urges the President of
the United States" to do the same.43 9 According to the Court, this was a mere
declaration of political sentiment;" 0 the "conciliatory or precatory" language
was not language that "Congress uses to create substantive rights-especially
those that are enforceable against the co-sovereign States.""'
Similarly, the Court found the second substantive provision, contained in
section three of the resolution, to be without any force." 2 This provision
declares that nothing in the Resolution is "intended to serve as a settlement of
any claims against the United States."" 3  The Hawai'i Supreme Court
characterized the section as a "congressional recognition-and preservation-
of claims against Hawaii."4" Under this interpretation, the provision was
believed to serve as the basis for reconciliation and the eventual initiation of a
settlement process with Native Hawaiians." 5 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
this reasoning, finding "no justification for turning an express disclaimer of
claims against one sovereign into an affirmative recognition of claims against
another."" 6
In addition to these two provisions, the Apology Resolution opens with
thirty-seven "whereas" clauses, and the U.S. Supreme Court took issue with the
Hawai'i court's conclusion that these clauses demonstrated Congress'
acknowledgement of the continuity of Native Hawaiian claims to the trust
lands." 7 The U.S. Supreme Court believed that the clauses could not "bear the
weight that the lower court placed on them."" 8 They had no "operative effect,"
and in the absence of such, "a court has no license to make [clauses] do what
438 Id. at 1443.
439 Apology Resolution, supra note 1, § 1, 107 Stat. at 1513.
440 Hawaii, 129 S. Ct. at 1443-44.
4' Id. at 1443.
442 Id. at 1443-44.
44 Apology Resolution, supra note 1, § 3, 107 Stat. at 1514.
4" Hawaii, 129 S. Ct. at 1444 (emphasis in original).
44 See id.
446 Id.
44 See HCDCHI, 117 Haw. 174, 191, 177 P.3d 884, 901 (2008).
448 Hawaii, 129 S. Ct. at 1444.
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[they were] not designed to do.""'9 Second, the clauses did not alter any of the
State's rights and obligations.4 50 Any legislative intent to do so would need to
be "clear and manifest," and the Resolution lacked any indication "that
Congress intended to amend or repeal . .. rights and obligations" that the State
acquired under the Admission Act.4 5 1 Finally, the Court had misgivings about
retroactively "clouding" the State's title to land it purportedly acquired in
absolute fee in 1959.452 Doing so "would raise grave constitutional concerns,"
and the Court was unwilling to extend that much influence to the "whereas"
clauses.4 53
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision faulted the Hawai'i Supreme Court for
its interpretation of the Apology Resolution,4 54 but standing alone, the ruling
did not lift the moratorium on trust land transfers. Although the Apology
Resolution did not ultimately bring any enforceable means for redress, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court also rested its opinion on state law, which arguably
could be enough to preserve the injunction. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court
remanded the case, acknowledging that it lacked "authority to decide questions
of Hawaiian law." 45 5
In May 2009, OHA, three of the individual plaintiffs, and the State reached
an agreement to dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice, contingent on the
456
enactment of proposed legislation. Eventually signed into law that year as
Act 176 457 the legislation requires a two-thirds approval by the Legislature for
the sale or gift of public trust and other lands.458 Land exchanges continue to
require a two-thirds disapproval of either house or majority disapproval by the
entire Legislature.4 59 In addition, Act 176 calls for specific details on any sale,
gift, or exchange of public trust land to be set forth in a resolution with notice
460to OHA as well as the Legislature.
" id.
450 id.
451 Id. at 1445.
452 id
453 id.
454 Id at 1444-45.
455 Id. at 1445.
456 Settlement Agreement, HCDCH I, 117 Haw. 174, 177 P.3d 884 (2008) (on file with
author).
457 Act 176's legislative history is available at
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2009/lists/measureindiv.aspx?billtype=SB&
billnumber-1677 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
458 Act of July 13, 2009, No. 176, § 2, 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws 705, 706-07.
459 Id. § 3.
460 Id. § 2 (codified at HAW. REv. STAT. § 171-64.7) (Supp. 2010)), § 3 (codified at HAW.
REV. STAT. § 171-50(c) (Supp. 2010)). In 2011, Act 176 was amended to require State agencies
to specify whether a parcel they propose to alienate is part of the public land trust. Act of June
27, 2011, No. 169, § 1, 2011 Haw. Sess. Laws 579, 579-80.
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Although Act 176 set up a procedure allowing the State to transfer trust
lands, it also created a barrier to adjudication for the only plaintiff who did not
settle with the State. In Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and Community
Development Corporation of Hawai'i (HCDCH II),461 Jonathan Kay
Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio continued to pursue his appeal after remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court.46 2 Although the Hawai'i Supreme Court could no longer
rely on the Apology Resolution, the court in HCDCH I had also cited specific
state laws as support for the moratorium.46 3
On July 15, 2009, two days after Act 176 became law, the State moved to
dismiss Osorio's claims.4 64 The State argued that Osorio lacked standing, that
the case was not yet ripe for adjudication, and that Osorio sought an advisory
opinion.4 6 5 The Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled that Osorio had standing to sue
but that Act 176 rendered his claims no longer ripe for adjudication.46 6
Osorio was able to establish his right to sue based on his status as a member
of the general public and his rights as a Hawaiian.46 7 Section 5(f) of the
Admission Act names the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians, as
defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, as one of the trust
purposes.46 8 Since the HHCA definition of "Native Hawaiian" is tied to a fifty
percent Hawaiian ancestry requirement, the State argued that Osorio, who is
Native Hawaiian but not an eligible beneficiary under the HHCA definition,
was not a beneficiary of the section 5(f) trust.4 69 Therefore, according to the
State, Osorio could not bring a claim on behalf of Native Hawaiians or allege
an injury in fact for a duty owed to Native Hawaiians.470
The court rejected this argument, holding that Osorio could bring a claim as
a member of the general public.4 7 1 The court explained that article XII, section
461 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (HCDCHII), 121 Haw.
324, 219 P.3d 1111 (2009).
462 id
463 Id. at 328, 219 P.3d at 1115.
464 id.
465 Id. at 326, 219 P.3d at 1113.
466 Id. at 339, 219 P.3d at 1126. Having found that that the case was not ripe, the court did
not consider the advisory opinion issue. Id. at 339 n. 13, 219 P.3d at 1126 n.13.
467 Id. at 335, 219 P.3d at 1122.
468 Id. at 329, 219 P.3d at 1116.
469 id.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 332, 219 P.3d at 1119. The State also seemed to argue that since Osorio stated that
he was Hawaiian, rather than Native Hawaiian, and he claimed that his rights as a Hawaiian
were "separate and distinct from those of the general public," he could not bring a claim "under
article XII, section 7 [sic] as a member of the general public." Id. at 333, 219 P.3d at 1120.
The court, however, was not convinced, asserting that the State "mischaracterize[d] Osorio's
position," id., and that it would be "absurd and contrary to this court's rules of constitutional
interpretation" to hold that Hawaiians, who are not specifically delineated as beneficiaries in
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4472 of the Hawai'i Constitution states that both Native HawaiianS473 and the
general public are beneficiaries of trust lands. 474 Following an earlier case on
standing,47 5 the court held that Osorio had established standing as a member of
the general public by showing that he suffered an injury in fact and that "a
multiplicity of suits may be avoided by allowing [him] to sue to enforce the
State's compliance with [section] 5(f) trust provisions."4 76 Osorio's injury in
fact derived from his status as a member of the general public and trust
beneficiary with a "particular and threatened injury" based on his Hawaiian
cultural and religious connection to the land.477 Additionally, Osorio showed
that his cultural injuries were traceable to the State's actions in alienating
public trust lands; once the lands were "alienated from the public lands trust ...
[they would] be lost forever." 78 Furthermore, the court concluded that an
injunction would be favorable to Osorio and provide relief to him as a member
of the general public.479
Consistent with prior decisions lowering standing barriers in cases of public
interest, the court also determined that a multiplicity of suits could be avoided
by allowing Osorio to sue to enforce compliance with the section 5(f) trust
provisions. 4 80 Quoting Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, the court acknowledged that
"unless members of the public [(like Osorio, who happens to be Hawaiian)] and
[N]ative Hawaiians, as beneficiaries of the trust, have standing, the State would
section 7 [sic], cannot sue for breach of trust. Id. at 335, 219 P.3d at 1122. Osorio's status as a
Hawaiian and having special rights as a Hawaiian did not exclude him from also being
considered as a member of the general public "for the purposes of bringing suit under article
XII, section 7 [sic]." Id. (emphasis omitted).
472 Although the court referred to article XII, section 7 of the state constitution, it actually
quotes from article XII, section 4.
473 Previous case law had already established that Native Hawaiians as defined in the HHCA
have a right to sue to enforce the § 5(f) trust provision. HCDCHII, 121 Haw. at 332, 219 P.3d
at 1119 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 592 n.8, 837 P.2d 1247, 1257 n.8 (1992)
("The [United States Court of Appeals for the] Ninth Circuit has consistently held that native
Hawaiians and native Hawaiian groups have standing to bring claims to enforce the trust
provisions of the Admission Act."); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir. 1991)
("[P]ersons in the position of these appellants do have standing to challenge the use of section
5(f) lands."); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that Native Hawaiians
can make allegations sufficient to show that there is an injury in fact even though legitimate
section 5(f) uses might not necessarily benefit Native Hawaiians)).
474 HCDCHII, 121 Haw. at 333, 219 P.3d at 1120.
475 Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 652 P.2d 1130 (1982).
476 HCDCHII, 121 Haw. at 335, 219 P.3d at 1122.
477 Id. at 334, 219 P.3d at 1121.
478 id
4 Id. at 333, 219 P.3d at 1120.
480 Id. at 335, 219 P.3d at 1122 (citing Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 594, 837 P.2d
1247, 1258 (1992)).
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be free to dispose of the trust res without the citizens of the State having any
recourse.A81
The court, however, determined that Osorio's claims were not ripe; that is,
based on a controversy that is concrete and needs no further factual
development.482 After discussing at length the process established by Act
176, the court concluded that since no land sale had been approved, "it
would be appropriate to first allow the legislature to exercise the power
reserved to it in Act 176 before this court determines whether such exercise of
power is or is not a violation of the State's fiduciary duties.,484
The Moon Court's public land trust decisions may appear confusing-the
court decided the OHA revenue cases against Native Hawaiian interests, but
only after determining in OHA I that OHA was clearly entitled to a share of
revenues from airport concessionaires operating on trust lands. As suggested
earlier, these decisions may have had more to do with concerns about the state
treasury and deference to the legislative branch than Native Hawaiian rights.
Moreover, in the revenue cases, the court explicitly pointed to the state
constitutional mandate and the responsibility of the Legislature to give meaning
to that mandate.485
Chief Justice Moon's unanimous HCDCHI opinion, a remarkable decision,
demonstrated a deep understanding of Hawai'i's history and culture, and the
importance of the trust lands to the Native Hawaiian community. Even though
the U.S. Supreme Court repudiated the Hawai'i court's reliance on the Apology
Resolution, HCDCHIwas also grounded in Hawai'i trust law and, as indicated
in HCDCHII, has continuing viability. Moreover, HCDCHII recognized that
a Native Hawaiian member of the general public who does not meet the HHCA
blood quantum limitation nevertheless suffers actual harm through the
alienation of trust lands. In the HCDCH decisions, the Moon Court, relying on
Chief Justice Richardson's Ahuna case and Associate Justice Klein's Pele
Defense Fund decision, walked farther on the path of justice than any other
Hawai'i court.
481 Id. (quoting Pele Def Fund, 73 Haw. at 594, 837 P.2d at 1258).
482 Citing its decision in HCDCH I, the court explained that for ripeness, "the court must
look at the facts as they exist today in evaluating whether the controversy before us is
sufficiently concrete to warrant our intervention." Id. at 336, 219 P.3d at 1123.
483 Id. at 337-38, 219 P.3d at 1124-25.
484 Id. at 339, 219 P.3d at 1126. The court thus dismissed the case without prejudice. Id.
485 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA 1), 96 Haw. 388,400,31 P.3d 901,913 (2001);
Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. State (OHA II), 110 Haw. 338, 366, 133 P.3d 767, 795 (2006).
Indeed, the Legislature's 2012 action to settle the issue of back revenues due OHA indicates that
the Legislature took the Moon Court's admonition to heart. See Act ofApril 11, 2012, No. 15,
2012 Haw. Sess. Laws 24.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Moon's seventeen-year tenure on the Hawai'i Supreme Court
has had a lasting impact on Native Hawaiians. The Moon Court opened the
doors of the judiciary to the Native Hawaiian people and gave recognition to
the historical claims of the Native Hawaiian community to lands, natural and
cultural resources, and ultimately, sovereignty. The major decisions authored
by Chief Justice Moon in the last five years of his tenure-Kalima, HCDCHI,
HCDCHII, and Kaleikini-show a strong and growing recognition of the role
the courts play in bringing about reconciliation and healing in society. The
Moon Court walked the path of justice, Ke Ala Pono, and set a solid course
toward reconciliation.
Controversies over trust lands, natural and cultural resources, and
sovereignty will continue to challenge the people of Hawai'i in the coming
years, and Hawai'i's courts will be called upon to address those controversies.
To reconcile Hawai'i's past with its future, to bring about balance, harmony
and aloha, and to hold us together as a community, the Hawai'i Supreme Court
must continue to travel the path ofjustice.
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